Nova Southeastern University

NSUWorks
Faculty Scholarship

Shepard Broad College of Law

2003

Democratic Legitimacy in Human Rights: The Future of
International Decision-Making
Douglas Lee Donoho

Follow this and additional works at: https://nsuworks.nova.edu/law_facarticles
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Douglas Donoho, The Democratic Legitimacy in Human Rights: The Future of International DecisionMaking, 21 Wis. Int'l L.J. 1 (2003).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Shepard Broad College of Law at NSUWorks. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized administrator of NSUWorks. For more
information, please contact nsuworks@nova.edu.

DATE DOWNLOADED: Mon Apr 4 12:37:30 2022
SOURCE: Content Downloaded from HeinOnline
Citations:
Bluebook 21st ed.
Douglas Lee Donoho, Democratic Legitimacy in Human Rights: The Future of
International Decision-Making, 21 Wis. INT'l L.J. 1 (2003).
ALWD 7th ed.
Douglas Lee Donoho, Democratic Legitimacy in Human Rights: The Future of
International Decision-Making, 21 Wis. Int'l L.J. 1 (2003).
APA 7th ed.
Donoho, D. (2003). Democratic legitimacy in human rights: the future of international
decision-making. Wisconsin International Law Journal, 21(1), 1-64.
Chicago 17th ed.
Douglas Lee Donoho, "Democratic Legitimacy in Human Rights: The Future of
International Decision-Making," Wisconsin International Law Journal 21, no. 1 (2003):
1-64
McGill Guide 9th ed.
Douglas Lee Donoho, "Democratic Legitimacy in Human Rights: The Future of
International Decision-Making" (2003) 21:1 Wis Int'l LJ 1.
AGLC 4th ed.
Douglas Lee Donoho, 'Democratic Legitimacy in Human Rights: The Future of
International Decision-Making' (2003) 21(1) Wisconsin International Law Journal 1
MLA 9th ed.
Donoho, Douglas Lee. "Democratic Legitimacy in Human Rights: The Future of
International Decision-Making." Wisconsin International Law Journal, vol. 21, no. 1,
2003, pp. 1-64. HeinOnline.
OSCOLA 4th ed.
Douglas Lee Donoho, 'Democratic Legitimacy in Human Rights: The Future of
International Decision-Making' (2003) 21 Wis Int'l LJ 1
Provided by:
NSU Shepard Broad College of Law Panza Maurer Law Library
-- Your use of this HeinOnline PDF indicates your acceptance of HeinOnline's Terms and
Conditions of the license agreement available at
https://heinonline.org/HOL/License
-- The search text of this PDF is generated from uncorrected OCR text.
-- To obtain permission to use this article beyond the scope of your license, please use:
Copyright Information

DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY IN HUMAN RIGHTS:
THE FUTURE OF INTERNATIONAL
DECISION-MAKING
DOUGLAS LEE DONOHO*

I.

INTRODUCTION

The past decade has witnessed a significant increase in the
scope and effectiveness of international governance. Most dramatically, the decisions of international organizations such as the
World Trade Organization (WTO), International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and World Bank have increasingly implicated policy
choices once considered to be exclusively within the domestic
sphere.' The increasing effectiveness and jurisdictional scope of
such international institutions have generated growing popular
and scholarly debate about the democratic legitimacy of international decision-making.2
Thus far, the discourse has focused on the activities of organizations whose functions are primarily economic. Perhaps because of their general ineffectiveness and current lack of
authority,3 international human rights institutions have received
Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center;
B.A. Kalamazoo College; J.D. Rutgers University-Camden; LL.M. Harvard Law
School.
See, e.g., Patti Goldman, The Democratization of the Development of United
States Trade Policy, 27 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 631, 634-43 (1994); Jeffery Atik, Identifying Anti-Democratic Outcomes: Authenticity, Self-Sacrifice, And International
Trade, 19 1J. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 229, 230-39 (1998); Julian G. Ku, The Delegation of Federal Power to InternationalOrganizations:New Problems with Old Solutions, 85 MINN. L. REV. 71, 84-88, 96-112 (2000). See also infra notes 1-20, 2836 and accompanying text.
2 See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 1; Phillip R. Trimble, Globalization, International
Institutions and the Erosion of National Sovereignty and Democracy, 95 MICH. L.
REV. 1944, 1966 (1997); JEREMY RABKIN, WHY SOVEREIGNTY MArTrERS (1998);
John Bolton, Should We Take Global Governance Seriously? 1 CHI. J. INT'L L.
205 (2000) (one of many essays from a conference sponsored by the University of
Chicago entitled: "Trends in Global Governance: Do They Threaten American
Sovereignty?"); Andrew Moravcsik, Conservative Idealism and InternationalInstitutions, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 291 (2000); Joel Richard Paul, Is Global Governance
Safe for Democracy? 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 263 (2000); Ku, supra note 1. See also
DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 341-60 (1996).
See infra notes 99, 104-06, 139-46 and accompanying text. The European Court
of Human Rights (ECHR) is often described as the only generally effective international human rights institution, measured in terms of state cooperation and
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scant attention in this regard.4 This omission is deeply ironic since

the international human rights system, itself a champion of democratic liberties and democratic self-governance, may ultimately
present significant anti-democratic implications for national polities as its institutional decision making framework matures.
As developed below, these potentially negative implications
for local democratic governance will primarily arise with the ad-

vent of increasingly authoritative international decision-making
over contestable human rights standards.' Ultimately, the future
development of authoritative international governance over contestable human rights has the potential for displacing local preferences and democratically produced outcomes with those of

compliance. See, e.g., Douglas Donoho, Autonomy, Self-Governance and the Margin of Appreciation, 15 EMORY INT'L L. REV. 391, 463-65 (2002); Lawrence Helfer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Towards a Theory of Effective Supranational
Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 273-45 (1997) (promoting the European system
as a model of effective international adjudication of human rights); Makua wa
Mutua, Looking Past the Human Rights Committee: An Argument for DeMarginalizing Enforcement, 4 BuFF. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 211, 245-52 (1998).
4 A 1986 article by Professor Weiler addresses similar concerns regarding the European Court of Justice's (ECJ) consideration and use of human rights standards
when deciding issues of European Union law. See J.H.H. Weiler, Eurocracy and
Distrust:Some Questions Concerning the Role of the European Court of Justice in
the Protectionof FundamentalHuman Rights Within the Legal Order of the European Communities, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1103 (1986). Some of the literature addressing the democratic legitimacy of international governance generally includes
references to human rights institutions. See, e.g., Ku, supra note 1, at 79-80, 10610; Paul Stephans, InternationalGovernance and American Democracy, 1 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 237, 241-42, 253-54 (2000). See also Julie Mertus, From Legal Transplants
to Transformative Justice: Human Rights and the Promise of TransnationalCivil
Society, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1335, 1340-41, 1355-88 (1999) (discussing potential anti-democratic implications of the development of "transnational civil society" and increased authority of non-state actors in human rights); Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann, ConstitutionalismAnd InternationalAdjudication: How To Constitutionalize the U.N. Dispute Settlement System? 31 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 753,
761-84 (1999) (arguing for the "constitutionalization" of international human
rights law and international judicial protections).
See infra notes 175-86 and accompanying text. I have used the word "contestable" here to differentiate between human rights that enjoy clear international
consensus over meaning and those whose meaning is subject to continuing, reasonable debate. Little genuine controversy exists, for example, regarding the
meaning of torture, summary execution or disappearances. In contrast, substantial debate exists between societies regarding the precise contours of many other
rights such as privacy and free speech. See infra notes 92-93, 181-84 and accompanying text.
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unaccountable and unrepresentative international decision-makers. This potential will become increasingly problematic for democracy as the international human rights system develops more
potent forms of decision-making, particularly powers similar to
judicial review.6 Such decision-making also has the potential for
disrupting diverse visions of democratic governance and corresponding choices regarding the appropriate balance between
majoritarian rule and individual liberties.7 These, and other potential implications for democracy outlined below, raise important questions regarding the future structure and process of
international human rights decision-making, the authority and
accountability of international decision-makers, and the appropriate legal status and domestic effect of such decisions.
Many of the issues discussed below depend on context and
future institutional developments that are uncertain at best. Mediating the tensions between international human rights governance and domestic democracy will ultimately require a wide
range of complex value judgments and political compromises.
Accordingly, my purpose here is to describe the potential fault
lines and tensions that increasingly authoritative international
human rights governance may create for democratic self-rule.
The point of this discussion is that such tensions should be recognized, acknowledged, and accommodated as international human
rights institutions evolve more authoritative and effective decision-making.
Democratic governance in the current world order, manifested predominately in the form of nation-states, 8 demands that
6

8

See infra notes 137-86 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.
It is clear that the current international legal order is in a period of fundamental
transformation. See, e.g., James Wilets, The Demise of the Nation-State: Towards
a New Theory of the State Under InternationalLaw, 17 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 193
(1999). Traditional conceptions of "sovereignty," fundamental to the existing international legal order, are similarly in transition. See, e.g., John Jackson, The
Great 1994 Sovereignty Debate: United States Acceptance and Implementation of
the Uruguay Round Results, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 157 (1997); Moravcsik,
supra note 2. Despite this changing legal landscape, it remains fundamentally true
that the international legal order is largely premised on the existence of independent nation-states that both create international rules and enforce them, often via
international organizations created for such purposes. Most importantly for present purposes, the nation-state (and political sub-parts) remains intimately related to the concept of demos or shared political community that is critical to

Wisconsin InternationalLaw Journal
human rights decision-making develop in ways that will account
for, and enhance, self-governance and autonomy values.9 This is
particularly critical for those international institutions that either
possess, or are in the process of developing, judicial or quasi-judicial dispute resolution authority over human rights issues.1" Alternatives to enhance democratic legitimacy of future
international human rights decision-making may include institutional or structural safeguards designed to ensure the accountability, responsiveness and "connected-ness" of international
decision-makers and processes. 1 The most important response,
however, may be the development of carefully crafted standards
of review for contestable human rights that provide an appropriate measure of deference for genuine democratic self-governance
and local autonomy. While respecting local democratic preferences, such standards should be calculated to recognize differences among rights, 2 the development of international consensus
over norms, the myriad and subtle forms of oppression, and the
democratic authenticity (or not) of local outcomes. 3 Given the
democratic self-governance. Modern democracies almost inevitably manifest
themselves and their shared political community in terms of the nation-state.
Thus, United Nations efforts to support democracy through election monitoring
are entirely organized around the concept of the nation-state as defined by the
people or demos that it comprises. See infra note 21. While it is certainly possible
to reasonably argue for different definitions of the appropriate demos (and for
different definitions of the demos regarding different issues or subjects) see, e.g.,
Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly:
Legitimacy and the Power of PopularSovereignty, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 191, 19195, 207-220 (2000), the nation state will undoubtedly remain the primary manifestation of democracy for the foreseeable future. See infra notes 25-26.
See infra notes 70-78, 149-91 and accompanying text.
10See infra notes 137-77 and accompanying text.
" See infra notes 79-85, 101-103. 110-114. 127-30, 150-75 and accompanying text.
12 See infra notes 5, 62, 184-86, 190-91 and accompanying text. It seems reasonable
to believe, for example, that the international community will eventually reach
consensus over universal meaning for an increasing number of rights. Presumably, such consensus gives concrete meaning to states' inchoate international
human rights obligations, leaving little room for democratically produced variations. Even this conclusion, however, is not beyond doubt, as unresolved issues
will undoubtedly arise regarding the appropriate balance between democratic
choice and international consensus and the nature of states' international human
rights obligations. See infra notes 137-46, 170-77, 185-86.
'3

See infra notes 173-75, 185-87, and 190 and accompanying text. Given the international community's fundamental endorsement of democratic rule, see infra notes
21-24 and accompanying text, it follows that the existence of genuine democracy
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substantial indeterminacy and political nature of many rights,14
these standards must ultimately provide some appropriate measure of respect for the social and political choices that emerge
from internal domestic discourse and democratic deliberation.

This should include due regard for each democratic society's
preferences regarding the complex balance between majoritarian
rule, public interest and the rights of minorities and individuals. 5

II.

INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE AND DEMOCRACY:

THE GENERAL CRITIQUE

In recent years, a growing chorus of critics has alleged that
major international organizations suffer from various "democracy deficits."16 Concerned with the relative unaccountability of
international decision-makers and the potential displacement of
domestic democratic choices, such critiques challenge the democratic legitimacy of international governance. These concerns

should be a critical factor in determining the degree of deference that international decision-makers may give to local outcomes. See also infra notes 25, 188,
190-91 and accompanying text. The lack of authentic democratic processes, or
the existence of oppressive social forces that have clearly distorted such
processes, should arouse added suspicion regarding government actions and eliminate the essential rationale for such deference or respect.
14 See infra notes 91-93, 178-86 and accompanying text.
"SSee infra notes 170-77, 189 and accompanying text.
16

See, e.g., Atik, supra note 1, at 230-39; Bill Cash, European Integration:Dangers
for the United States, 1 CHI. J. INTL. L. 315 (2000); Goldman, supra note 1, at 65460; Ku, supra note 1, at 84-88, 96-112; Peter L. Lindseth, Democratic Legitimacy
and the Administrative Characterof Supranationalism: The Example of the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 633-44, 672-84 (1999); Jeremy Rabkin,
Is EU Policy Eroding the Sovereignty of Non-Member States?, 1 CHI. J. INTL. L.
273 (2000); Stephans, supra note 4, at 237-41, 245-47; Trimble, supra note 2, at
1966. See also John McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REV. 511, 513-21, 534-43 (2000) (refuting the position that the
WTO poses a threat to democratic governance); Gregory C. Shaffer, The World
Trade Organization Under Challenge: Democracy And The Law And Politics Of
The WTO's Treatment Of Trade And Environment Matters, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L.
REV. 1 (2001); See generally Daniel Bodansky, The Legitimacy of International
Governance: A Coming Challenge for International Environmental Law, 93 AM.
J. INT'L L. 596, 596-600, 608-19 (1999); Moravcsik, supra note 2, at 291-93, 304-08;
J.H.H. Weiler, The Transformation of Europe, 100 YALE L.J. 2403, 2430-31
(1991).
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overlap and parallel two related developments involving recognition of the changing nature of state sovereignty17 and the in-18
creased international importance of democratic governance.
Politicians and academics alike have increasingly acknowledged
that traditional notions of unfettered state sovereignty have
given way in the face of significant transnational problems in an
interdependent world. For a variety of reasons, states have
looked to international legal disciplines over issues once thought
exclusively domestic, sometimes delegating elements of traditional sovereign authority to international organizations.19 Increasingly effective international regulation over some subjects,
17 See supra notes 2, 8. See generally Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty,

Globalizationand Human Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1999); J.
Goldsmith, Sovereignty, International Relations Theory, and International Law
(Book Review of S. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED HYPOCRISY), 52
STAN. L. REV. 959 (2000); Jackson, Sovereignty Debates, supra note 8.
'8Democratic governance has increasingly become an important criterion for gov-

ernment legitimacy under international law. See, e.g.,

THE VIENNA DECLARA-

ACTION, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.157/23, (1993) at 2,
reprinted in, 32 I.L.M. 1661 (1993); Resolution on Representative Democracy,
'
OAS, General Assembly, 5t Sess., AGIRes.1080 (XXI- 0/91) (1991); European
Community: Declaration on Guidelines on Yugoslavia and on the Recognition of
New States, Dec. 16, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 1485, 1487 (1991); Conference for Security &
Co-operation in Europe, Charter of Paris for a New Europe, Nov. 19-21, 1990,
Principle 1, available at http:// www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999/summits/
paris90e.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2003). See generally Douglas Donoho, Evolution or Expediency: The United Nations' Response to the Disruption of Democracy, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 329 (1996); DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW (Gregory Fox & Brad Roth, eds., 2000); Stephen J. Schnably, The Santiago Commitment as a Call to Democracy in the United States: Evaluating the OAS Role in Haiti, Peru, and Guatemala, 25 INTER-AM. L. REV. 393
(1994).
19 Apart from the EU, the most prominent examples of this trend have occurred in
TION AND PROGRAMME OF

the area of international trade with the advent of the WTO and NAFTA. See
supra note 1. The IMF has also been castigated for interfering with domestic
democratic priorities when it attaches significant social and financial constraints
on a recipient state's policy alternatives in conjunction with structural adjustment
packages. See, e.g., Antony Anghie, Time Present and Time Past: Globalization,
InternationalFinancialInstitutions and the Third World, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. &
POL. 243, 266 & 274 (2000); Anthony Galano III, Comment, International Monetary Fund Response to the Brazilian Debt Crisis: Whether the Effects of Conditionality Have Undermined Brazil's National Sovereignty?, 6 PACE INT'L L. REV. 323,
338-49 (1994). There is a growing variety of other emerging international legal
disciplines over traditionally domestic topics. A list might include the environment (e.g., Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, FCCC/CP/7/Add.1, reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 2243 (1998) (standards
for greenhouse gases)); food safety standards (Codex Alimentarius Commission
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particularly trade, has begun to implicate a wide range of domestic policy choices involving sensitive topics such as labor, environmental protection, public health and safety."
At the same time, democratic governance has gained significant prominence in international affairs. The United Nations, for
example, now expends significant resources toward the spread of
democracy.21 Prominent international organizations such as the
standards, available at http://www.codexalimentarius.net/#) (last visited Jan. 14,
2003) (which create a presumption of acceptable scientific basis for food standards under GATT 94); labor standards (International Labor Organization, see
http://www.ilo.org/); product technical standards (e.g., International Organization
for Standardization, ISO programs, see http://www.iso.org); and conservation
(Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and
Fauna, done March 3, 1973, Art. XV, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 UNTS 243). See generally Kal Raustiala, Note: The "ParticipatoryRevolution" In InternationalEnvironmental Law, 21 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 537 (1997); David A. Wirth, Reexamining
Decision-Making Processesin InternationalEnvironmental Law, 79 IOWA L. REV.
769 (1994); Lewis Rosman, Public Participationin InternationalPesticide Regulation: When the Codex Commission Decides, Who Will Listen?, 12 VA. ENVTL. L.J.
329, 345-46, 357-65 (1993). The international human rights system, while presently underdeveloped, could ultimately mature in ways similar to the European
Court of Human Rights (ECHR). See infra note 3; supra notes 108, 112 & 143;
Donoho, Autonomy, supra note 3, at 455-62. Effective international governance
over human rights issues would undeniably have pronounced implications for domestic policy choices. See infra notes 138-49 and accompanying text. This potential has caused an alarmist over-reaction among some conservative
commentators. See, e.g., Bolton, supra note 2, at 212-18; Stephan, supra note 4, at
241-42.
20 See infra notes 28-36 and accompanying text; supra notes I and 18. There has
been some effort to create additional mechanisms for the integration of competing policy concerns before international bodies. See, e.g., Jack I. Garvey, Trade
Law and Quality Of Life-Dispute Resolution under the NAFTA Side Accords on
Labor and the Environment, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 439, 440-53 (1995) (describing the
NAFTA "side agreements" as a model for integrating other values and policy
concerns into the international trade regime). But see McGinnis & Movsesian,
supra note 16, at 518-21, 550-58 (endorsing the exclusion of such interests and
limitations on WTO's potential "regulatory" functions). There has also been a
trend to increase the opportunities for interest group participation in international decision-making processes, primarily via NGO's. See generally Mertus,
supra note 4; Raustiala, supra note 19; William Reichert, Note, Resolving the
Trade and Environmental Conflict: The WTO and NGO Consultative Relations, 5
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 219, 226-27, 237-46 (1996). See also Bolton, supra note
2, at 215-18; infra note 36.
21See generally Donoho, Expediency, supra note 18. From election monitoring to
technical assistance, the United Nations has recently devoted significant resources to the promotion and maintenance of democracy. Id. at 334-341. There
are also indications that disruptions of democratic governance may constitute a
threat to peace justifying collective action by the Security Counsel. See id. at 358-

8
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Council of Europe, the Organization of American States and the
Organization for Cooperation and Security in Europe have made
democratic governance a criterion for membership and a measure of government legitimacy.2 Always a champion of individual democratic liberties,23 the international human rights system
has also increasingly emphasized the importance of democratic
self-governance in the collective sense. "

70; U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/940 (1994) (authorizing "all necessary means" to bring about "the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti...").
See supra note 18. All members of the Council of Europe participate in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe, which has made democratic
governance a pre-requisite to government legitimacy. Statute of the Council of
Europe, May 5, 1949, art. 3, 87 U.N.T.S. 103, 106. See also Thomas Franck, The
Democratic Entitlement, 29 U. RICH. L. REV. 1, 27-29 (1994). See also Thomas

Grant, An Institution Restored? Book Review of M.J.

PETERSON, RECOGNITION

OF GOVERNMENTS: LEGAL DOCTRINE AND STATE PRACTICE,

1815-1995, 39

VA.

J. INT'L L. 191, 196-99, 211 (1998). For the recognition policies of members of the
European Union, see EUROPEAN POLITICAL COOPERATION, DECLARATION ON
THE "GUIDELINES ON THE RECOGNITION OF NEW STATES IN EASTERN EUROPE

THE SOVIET UNION," Dec. 16, 1991, reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 1486 (1992).
The OAS has implicitly taken a similar stance by requiring suspension of any
member state whose democratic government is removed by force. Protocol of
Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States, OEA/ser. P./
OAS Doc. AG./doc.li (XVI-E/92), Dec.14, 1992, art. 9, reprinted in, 33 I.L.M.
1005 (1994). See supra note 18.
AND IN

International recognition of individual democratic liberties such as the rights to
vote, free speech, petition, and participate in government, is ubiquitous among
international human rights treaties and declarations. See, e.g., Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217 A(3), U.N. Doc. A\810, at 71, adopted, Dec.
10, 1948, Arts. 18-21; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 99
U.N.T.S.171, U.N. Doc. A\6316 (1966) (ICCPR) at Arts. 18-22, 25; International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 660
U.N.T.S. 195 (entered into force Jan. 4, 1969) (CERD) at Arts. 5; Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1249 U.N.T.S.
13 (CEDAW) at Arts. 7-8. The prominence of political and civil liberties in the
treaty regime and its emphasis on the individual has prompted complaints that
the international human rights system exhibits a "Western bias." See, e.g., Makua
wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights, 36 VA. J. INT'L L. 589, 653-56 (1996);
B. Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard, 92 FOR. POL'Y 24, 26-34, 39 (1993).
24 See Vienna Declaration, supra note 18 (suggesting that a government's legitimacy
depends upon receiving the consent of the governed). The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (CHR) has also approved a resolution endorsing an
international right to democracy. See M. Dennis, The Fifty-Fifth Session of the
Commission on Human Rights, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 189, 191-92 (2000) (citing CHR
Res. 1999/57).
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There is an obvious tension between these two developments. On the one hand, democratic governance implies the primacy of domestic (and perhaps, local) rule.' For the foreseeable
future, the shared political community or demos that define democratic rule will continue to be the citizens of the various nationstates (and their political subdivisions), rather than geographic
regions or the world community. 6 In contrast, international governance implies a shift in the locus of decision-making away from
domestic democratic polities to international fora. Thus, an increase in the effectiveness of international rule-making and conflict resolution, and its extension to important social and
economic issues, has raised serious concerns regarding an alleged

See supra note 79-80. The nation-state is clearly an imperfect measure of demos
in many parts of the world. This is amply demonstrated by widespread ethnic
conflicts, demands for secession or autonomy, and disputes over national borders
poorly drawn by prior colonial interests. See Bryan Schwartz & Susan Waywood,
A Model Declarationon the Right of Secession, 11 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 1, 1-10, 1517, 19-23, 33-35, 39-44 (1998); Diane Orentlicher, Separation Anxiety: International Responses to Ethno-SeparatistClaims, 23 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 6-9, 16-21, 4463 (1998). The "disconnect" between government and the governed, when coupled with rabid nationalism and the quest for power, has generated horrors
around the world from Kosovo to Kashmir. The resulting conflicts also demonstrate, albeit in distorted manifestations, the continuing power of the most basic
aim of democracy-the desire for self-governance by those who perceive themselves as belonging to a self-defined shared community.
26 One may, of course, entertain alternative visions of the appropriate demos, suggesting regional or even a global community of people with at least some attributes of self-rule. See Falk & Strauss, supra note 8. In some senses, everyone is a
citizen of overlapping polities. I am, for example, a member of the world community, the western hemisphere, the Americas, the United States, the State of
Florida, the County of Broward, the City of Ft. Lauderdale, and the Harbor
Beach Neighborhood Association. Similarly, it is clearly the case that some such
"self-governance groupings" may be issue specific. However tenuously, I may
arguably be a "citizen" of NAFTA for purposes of certain economic issues. The
absence of democratic attributes and mechanisms for expression of self-governance in these alternative political and legal settings is fundamentally what drives
the "democracy deficit" critiques described in this paper. See supra notes 16- 25
and accompanying text; infra notes 27-36, 49-52 and accompanying text. The European Union is, in many senses, a classic example of the potential evolution and
complexity of overlapping "citizenships." See infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text. For present purposes, it is enough to understand that democratic governance implies, at minimum, self-governance by groups of people identified as
belonging to a defined polity. At present, the predominate grouping for such
purposes is the nation-state and its political subparts. See supra note 8, 25.
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dilution of democratic self-governance and perceived losses in
state sovereignty.2 7
In general, democracy deficit critiques have primarily focused on major international economic organizations such as the
WTO and IMF and the liberal free market values that they epitomize. 2 The WTO in particular has been confronted with potentially serious political repercussions from panel decisions in trade
disputes that have challenged popular domestic programs in the
name of free trade. 29 Recent WTO panels, for example, have declared U.S. environmental programs protecting dolphins,30 turtles" and air quality3 2 inconsistent with GATT trade disciplines,
thereby generating significant academic and popular controversy.33 In a similar vein, a WTO panel decision recently disallowed European Union (EU) restrictions on hormone fed beef
27 See supra notes 19-20.
8

See, e.g., Anghie, supra note 19, at 266-74, 252-55 (IMF & World Bank; Goldman,
supra note 1, at 634-35, 640-44, 654-60; Ku, supra note 1, at 84-88, 96-112; Atik,
supra note 1, at 230-39; Trimble, supra note 2, at 1966;). See also McGinnis &
Movsesian, supra note 16, at 513-21, 534-43 (refuting the position that the WTO
poses a threat to democratic governance). Efforts toward international harmonization of health and safety standards for food and products via organizations such
as the Codex Commission and the International Standards Organization could
raise similar concerns, especially to the extent that such standards are tied into
the GATT trading disciplines. See Goldman, supra note 1, at 679-81; Rosman,
supra note 19, at 345-46, 357-65. See also supra note 18. To a lesser extent, the
concern over democratic legitimacy has also spread to the still embryonic forms
of transnational regulation of the environment. See, e.g., Bodansky, supra note
16; Shaffer, supra note 15; Wirth, supra note 19.
See generally Shaffer, supra note 16; Padideh Ala'I, A Human Rights Critique of
the WTO: Some Preliminary Observations,33 GEO. WASH. INT'L L. & ECON. 537
(2001).

GATT Dispute Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna,
B.I.S.D. (39th Supp.) at 155 (1993), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1954 (1991); GATT
Dispute Panel Report, United States-Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, June 16,
1994, GATT Doc. DS29/R, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 839 (1994).
31 WTO Appellate Body, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, Oct. 12, 1998, WT/DS58/AB/R, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 118
(1999). United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, WTIDS58R, May 15, 1998, modified by Appellate Body Report, WT/DS58/
AB/R, Oct. 12, 1998.
32United States Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, WT/DS2/
R, Jan. 29, 1996, reprinted in 35 I.L.M. 603 (1996).
3

See, e.g., Michael M. Weinstein & Steve Charnovitz, The Greening of the WTO,

(2001-11/1/01)

FOREIGN AFFAIRS

147 (2001) (available at 2001 WL 29745973);
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despite strong -public sentiments regarding its potential health
risks.34
Such decisions have provided powerful rhetorical ammuni-

tion for anti-globalists who complain that unaccountable international bureaucrats, disposed to favor liberal free market
capitalistic values, will dilute or usurp hard-fought democratic
outcomes. Highly publicized and sometimes violent public protests against the WTO have dramatically demonstrated the seriousness of this anti-globalist challenge.3 5 The size and depth of
these protests arguably reflect and fuel a growing public perception that important decisions affecting daily life are being made
by unaccountable actors who are predisposed to favor free trade
over other important social and political values.36 Whatever the
Patricia Hansen, Transparency, Standards of Review, and the Use of Trade Measures to Protect the Global Environment, 39 VA. J. INT'L L. 1017 (1999); David
Driesen, What is Free Trade?: The Real Issue Lurking Behind the Trade and Environment Debate, 41 VA. J. INT'L L. 279 (2001) (citing and reviewing the extensive
literature); Jeffrey L. Dunoff, "Trade and... ":Recent Developments in Trade Policy and Scholarship-And Their Surprising Political Implications,17 Nw. J. INT'L
L. & Bus. 759 (1997).
'

EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), WT/S26/R/USA
(Aug. 18, 1997); EC Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones),
GATT Doc. WT/DS26/9 (Sept. 25, 1997); Appellate Body Report, GATT Doc.
WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998).
5 By some estimates, as many as 50,000 protesters clashed with police at the Seattle
ministerial meeting of the WTO in 1999. See, e.g., John Burgess & Steven Pearlstein, Protests Delay WTO Opening: Seattle Police Use Tear Gas; Mayor Declares
a Curfew, WASH. POST, Dec. 1, 1999, at Al, available at 1999 WL 30306155;
Heath Foster & Kery Mirakami, Schell and Stamper Can Expect To Be Severely
Criticized, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Dec. 4, 1999, at A6, available at 1999
WL 30557154. Other large anti-globalist protests have followed Seattle, although
the events of September 11, 2001 have apparently altered the course of the protest movement. See, e.g., Anthony DePalma, In Quebec's Streets, Fervor, Fears
and a Gamut of Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2001, at Al (demonstrations at the
third Summit of the Americas); Robert McPherson, EU Summit Could Breathe
New Life Into Anti-Global Movement, Dec. 12, 2001, AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE,
available at 2001 WL 25084307 (describing European anti-globalist protests after
September 11); Paul Vallely, Globalization-Anti-globalProtest Fights on New
Front, THE INDEPENDENT, Dec. 28, 2001, (London), available at 2001 WL
31604957; Mike Woodsworth, Radicals Rail on Impending Economic Conference,
U-WIRE, Jan. 30, 2002, available at 2002 WL 8296614.

36See supra note 1-2. See also David Postman & Lynda V. Mapes, Why WTO

United So Many Foes,

SEATTLE TIMES,

Dec. 6, 1999, at A22 available at WL

6303041; Press Release, Public Citizen, WTO Report: Clinton Spin Cycle Unable
to Clean WTO's Record (Mar. 2, 2000), available at http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=890 (last visited Jan. 14, 2003). The political saliency of the
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merits of these positions, the significance of the debate for the
future of international governance should not be doubted.
The EU, the most developed model for international governance, has also been criticized for an alleged democracy deficit.37 Reflecting the EU's comprehensive scope and institutional
complexity, democracy deficit critiques of EU institutions are
more sophisticated than those typically aimed at other international institutions and add a dimension particularly relevant to
this study. EU law, consisting of the constitutive treaties38 and
anti-globalist movement can be seen in the responses of politicians to it. President Clinton has suggested greater public access to WTO trade negotiations and
the inclusion of environmental and labor issues on the organization's agenda. See
Burgess & Pearlstein, supra note 25; Ellen Iritani, White House Vows to Link
Environment, Trade Pacts Policy, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 17, 1999, at C17, availableat
1999 WL 26196420; Postman & Mapes, supra. The WTO itself has responded to
such protests and criticisms by increasing public and NGO access to information
and promising greater transparency to WTO activities. Press Release 10, World
Trade Organization, Ruggiero Announces Enhanced WTO Plan for Cooperation
with NGOs (July 17, 1998) (available at http://www.wto.org/english/news-e/
pres98e/prl07_e.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2003). In an apparent effort to improve
public relations, the organization's web site now includes "community forum,"
and "NGO" pages, see http://www.wto.org/english/forumse/forums-e.htm and
http://www.wto.org/english/thewtoe/minist-e/min0l_e/min0l-ngo-activ-e.htm
(last visited Jan. 14, 2003). In a similar vein, the WTO now invites and publishes
NGO "position papers" in order to create "greater transparency and an enhanced
dialogue with NGOs." See http://www.wto.org/english/forums-e/ngo-e/pospape.htm (last visited Jan. 14, 2003). Anti-globalism has also produced some
strange political bedfellows. Both Ralph Nader and Pat Buchanan, for instance,
have rallied political support from opposite sides of the political spectrum behind
similar anti-internationalist themes. See Postman & Mapps, supra.
3' For an insightful discussion of the evolution of EU institutions and the dynamics
that underlie current critiques of their democratic legitimacy see Weiler, Transformation, supra note 16, at 2430-31, 24-74. See also Bill Cash, European Integration: Dangers for the United States, 1 CHI. J. INT'L L. 315 (2000); Francesca
Bignami, The Democratic Deficit in European Community Rulemaking: A Call
For Notice and Comment in Comitology, 40 HARV. INT'L L. J. 451 (1999): Lindseth, supra note 16, at 633-44, 672-80; Moravcsik, supra note 2, at 291-93, 304-08;
Rabkin, EU Policy, supra note 16; supra note 4. There are many reasons why one
could reasonably view the EU and its institutions as sui generis. In contrast to
other global institutions, the EU has a limited membership consisting of states
with somewhat homogeneous populations, sharing a common history and cultural
orientation. EU institutions enjoy a general commonality of purposes, highly
evolved institutional structures, authoritative powers and a degree of popular acceptance absent in other international organizations. See Donoho, Autonomy,
supra note 3, at 462-66.
The EU's institutional structure, jurisdiction and powers have evolved enormously since its inception as a customs union in 1951. See generally Weiler, Transformation, supra note 16. This evolution has been accomplished largely through
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legislative output of the European Council and Commission,3 9
has enjoyed supremacy over domestic law for many years. ° The
significance of this supremacy was greatly enhanced by the European Court of Justice (ECJ),4 1 which confirmed its own final authority in decisions over the interpretation of EU law and
established doctrines of direct effect and implied powers.42 Since
the ECJ's authority includes the power to judge the consistency
the adoption of a series of treaties that now constitute the "constitutional framework" and "primary" or "basic" law for the EU. Id. at 2407-08.
3 The European Council is composed of a ministerial representative from each
member state and represents the interests of the member states in EU affairs.
Members of the Commission, in contrast, represent "European" interests. Together, with increasingly meaningful participation from the European Parliament,
these institutions are empowered under the EU treaty structure to create binding
legislation within the scope of the EU's jurisdiction. For a concise summary of
these general principles see BARRY CARTER & PHILLIP TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW

549-566

(3rd

ed. 1999). See also

EUROPEAN UNION LAW ANTHOL-

12-23 (Kole & D'Amato, eds. 1998). These powers are constrained by the
principle of "subsidiarity" that has been expressly incorporated into the governing treaty regime. Id. at 39-42. See generally Daniel Murphy, Subsidiarity
And/Or Human Rights, 29 U. RICH. L. REV.67 (1994). The subsidiarity principle
limits the Union's role regarding subjects over which they share jurisdiction with
national governments. See id. at 69-71. Correspondingly, the EU has exclusive
jurisdiction over some subjects and none at all over others that fall outside the
scope of the EU treaty regime. Id.
40See generally Weiler, Transformation,supra note 16, at 2413-17; EU ANTHOLOGY,
OGY,

supra note 39, at 59-65. The legal supremacy of EU "supranational" law-making
obviously creates constraints upon, or displacement of, domestic democratic authority. These effects are, in contrast to those threatened by other international
organizations or imagined by their critics, very real and tangible. Professor Weiler has concisely summarized this position: "Thus, the Council, a collectivity of
Ministers, on a proposal of the Commission, a collectivity of nonelected civil servants, could, and in some instances must, pass legislation which is binding and
enforceable even in the face of conflicting legislation passed by national parliaments." Weiler, Transformation, supra note 16, at 2466-67.
01 The European Court of Justice is the primary judicial organ of the European
Union. One of its primary functions is to provide uniform and authoritative interpretation EU law. Treaty Establishing the European Union, Arts. 220, 226-34.
Although human rights are not an overt part of the EU's mandate, the ECJ has
insisted that it must interpret and apply EU law consistently with the European
Convention on Human Rights. See, e.g., Society for the Protection of Unborn
Children v. Grogan, 1991 ECR 1-4685, 3 CMLR 849 (Eur. Ct. J., Oct. 4, 1991);
Grant v. South-West Trains, [1998] 1 CMLR 993, 1012-14, $$ 43-48 (Eur. Ct. J.,
Feb. 17, 1998). See generally Weiler, Transformation, supra note 16, at 2417-19.
12 See Van Gend en Loos v. Netherlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 ECR
1 (E.Ct. J. case 26/62); Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v. Simmenthal
S.P.A., 1978 ECR 629 (E. Ct. J. case 106/77). See also Weiler, Transformation,
supra note 16, at 2413-23, 2426.
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of domestic legislation with supreme EU law, the ECJ has essentially given itself a power of international judicial review which
extends into the domestic legal systems of the member states.43
These international legislative and judicial review powers have
caused critics of EU governance to single out the respective
"law-making" roles of executive officers' and international jurists for special scrutiny." As explained further below, the existence of authoritative international judicial power has
4 Id. at 2419-22. Professor Weiler has observed that the EU's displacement of domestic authority has been greatly facilitated by the ECJ's enlistment of national
courts in its assertion of judicial review. In particular, domestic courts found
their own powers greatly enhanced in that they were required, through the EU's
certification and review process, to apply legal authority (EU law) superior to
domestic legislation. Id. at 2426.
Democracy critiques of EU governance often tend to focus on the process by
which EU decisions are reached. Since the European Council, comprised of government ministers from each member state, must approve all EU legislation, the
executive branch of each domestic government is deeply involved in EU lawmaking. The European Parliament, the only popularly elected institution in the
EU, has very little substantive authority and provides a very limited democratic
check on the law-making authority of the Council and Commission. Recent innovations such as the co-decision making procedures allow the Parliament an increasingly meaningful voice in the direction of EU legislation and policy. See
Falk & Strauss, supra note 8, at 204-06. Whether an increase in parliamentary
authority answers concerns over democratic legitimacy, however, depends on
one's perspective regarding the possibility of a true European demos. See, e.g.,
Weiler, Transformation,supra note 16, at 2468-74.
4 The existence of legislative supremacy controlled primarily by executive officers,
and international judicial review, are both characteristics that distinguish the EU
from virtually all other international institutions. The WTO, for example, has
extremely limited capacity for creating binding rules. See generally RAJ BHALA,
"d
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 201-243 ( 2 ed. 2001); Ku,
supra note 1, at 96-99; McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 16, at 530-33. Ironically, it is the policing function of the WTO's dispute settlement panels which has
caused the most public controversy. See supra notes 31 to 36. Although the
WTO may, in a sense, create rules binding on its members by adopting "waivers,"
"amendments" or "interpretations" of the agreements by super-majority voting,
panel decisions are not directly binding beyond the parties to the dispute.
BHALA, supra at 204-06, 213-14, 240-43. The failure to comply with a panel decision (subject to appellate review) may eventually lead to a sanction in the form of
permission for the aggrieved party to "suspend concessions." Essentially invoked
by removing trading benefits-a generally useless remedy for all but the largest
states-neither the Panel decision nor such sanctions are directly binding or enforceable within the U.S. domestic legal system. See 19 U.S.C. § 3512 (a)(1)
(1994). In essence, the WTO is not truly a regulatory body with the power to
create or enforce binding rules on its members but rather a supervisory institution with limited capacity for meaningful enforcement. But see John H. Jackson,
The WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding-Misunderstandingson the Nature
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particularly significant implications for democratic selfgovernance.46
Such concerns parallel the well-trodden debate over the

democratic legitimacy of judicial review in American Constitutional Law described below. 7 They also present, however, spe-

cial problems particular to their international context that are
especially relevant to international judicial or quasi-judicial resolution of human rights issues.'
I1.

INTERNATIONAL DEMOCRACY DEFICIT AND
DEMOCRATIC DISPLACEMENT

There are, of course, many permutations to the emerging
democratic legitimacy critiques of international decision-making.
Two related themes, however, predominate. The first involves

serious questions regarding the democratic legitimacy of the
processes by which international organizations make decisions.

Such questions primarily focus on the structure of international
organizations and a perceived lack of democratic attributes in
their decision-making processes. One might describe this theme
as "international democratic deficit." The patently undemocratic
nature of UN decision-making provides one example. Depending upon whose ox is being gored, UN decision-making could be
castigated as either power oriented and unrepresentative of the
interests of weaker states (the Security Council)49 or, in contrast,
of Legal Obligations,91 AM. J. INT'L L. 60, 60-64 (1997) (refuting descriptions of
WTO rulings as non-binding). Human rights institutions, with the exception perhaps of the ECHR, have even more modest potential for creating effectively
binding obligations. See supra note 3; infra notes 104-106, 112, 142-49 and accompanying text.
4' See infra notes 149-86 and accompanying text. See also Weiler, Transformation,
supra note 16, at 2452-74.
41See infra notes 117-36 and accompanying text.
' See infra notes 137-83 and accompanying text.
41The Security Council is the only U.N. institution with the legal authority to issue
orders binding on the entire world community. It may do so only with regard to
issues of peace and security and upon the affirmative vote of 9 out of its 15 members, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France, China and the
Russian Federation (the permanent five). United Nations Charter, art. 23, 27, 39.
Although limited to issues of peace and security, an expanding conception of
threats to peace and lack of institutional checks on its power have caused increasing concern about the legitimacy of Security Council decision-making. See
Donoho, Expediency, supra note 18, at 370-79; David Caron, The Legitimacy of
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overly solicitous of small, less populated states without regard to
population or economic power (the General Assembly). 0 In either case, the interests and voices of common people are only
indirectly and tenuously represented, if at all.5 Similar complaints may be raised about most major international organizations, which after all, were created by sovereign states to serve
state interests. Perhaps one sign of the sensitivity of international organizations to such accusations is the increasing tendency to include non-governmental organizations in the process
of normative development. 2
The second, and closely related theme, involves the threat of
what might be called "democratic displacement." This theme invokes perceived losses in democratic self-rule as increasingly authoritative international organizations allegedly displace the
majoritarian preferences of domestic populations. The basic argument is straightforward and powerful. Since international decision-makers are foreign bureaucrats or experts, neither
culturally connected nor directly accountable through elections,53
the Collective Authority of the Security Council, 87 AM. J. INT'L L. 552, 562-66
(1993); Burns H. Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and PersianGulf Decision Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 516 (1991).
50 Organized around the premise of sovereign equality, the General Assembly operates on the principle of "one state, one vote." No distinctions in voting power are
made on the basis of population, economic power or other criteria, and the votes
of China and tiny Pacific Ocean mini-states like the Republic of Nauru carry
equal weight. See, e.g., Thomas Franck, United Nations Based Prospects For a
New Global Order, 22 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 601, 615-17 (1990). Although
the General Assembly has no binding authority beyond budgetary matters, such
voting arrangements present deeply anti-democratic implications since the collective and individual voices of people living in more populous societies are
devalued.
51 See Michael Reisman, Amending the UN Charter: The Art of the Feasible, 88 AM.
SOC. INT'L L. PROC. 108 (1995).
52 See generally Raustiala, supra note 19. See also Mertus, supra note 4, at 1385-88,
Garvey, supra note 20, at 440-42, 448-51 (praising NAFTA for increasing participation); Falk & Strauss, supra note 8, at 194-205 (outlining the role of "international civil society" in the development of international legal regimes). The lack
of public participation and transparency of WTO proceedings is a common criticism of that organization. See, e.g., Goldman, supra note 1, at 631-32, 643-48;
Garvey, supra note 20, at 448-50. The WTO itself seems aware of the public
relations problem involved. See supra note 36.
See, e.g., supra notes 39, 44; infra notes 101-103, 110-111, 165-72. Accountability
may be created, of course, in a variety of ways other than through direct elections. Thus, for example, many human rights institutions are composed of experts who are subject to review and periodic appointment by the state
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their decisions displacing democratically produced domestic policies lack the responsiveness and accountability necessary for
democratic legitimacy. 4 The most radical version of this claim
asserts that international governance is inherently and unalterably undemocratic in that it excessively dilutes the voice of individuals and societal groups and represents no recognizable
demos to justify its authority.5
These parallel concerns over "international democratic deficit" and "democratic displacement" are closely entwined. Thus,
the perceived lack of fair democratic decision-making processes
within international organizations exacerbates the concerns
raised by the threat that international decisions may displace domestic, democratically generated policies. When international
decisions lacking democratic authenticity and pedigree displace
domestic democratic choice, democracy itself is usurped. Taken
together, these inter-related themes challenge the wisdom and legitimacy of the current trend towards international resolution of
important transnational issues. More positively, they speak to
the need for developing an appropriate balance between increased international governance and the preservation of local
autonomy and democratic self-rule. Reminiscent of the traditional struggle between central and local authority,5 6 democratic
participants. In this sense there may be a form of indirect accountability to the
people via executive branch officers. This is, to say the least, a very attenuated
form of accountability. It is arguable whether global institutions with global con-

stituencies can ever, as a matter of basic structure, be responsive to any particular
population in the sense that democratic governance probably demands. See infra
notes 159-162 and accompanying text.
54 See supra notes 1-2, 16, 35-36 and accompanying
text.
5' Undoubtedly some extreme critics of international governance believe that concerns over national sovereignty and democratic displacement render all forms of
authoritative international decision-making inherently illegitimate. See, e.g., Bolton, supra note 2; Cash, supra note 16. See also Stephan, supra note 4. In this
view, the traditional consent based forms of international legal decision-making
are adequate to address any transnational problems that may confront the world.
Global interdependence is not, however, simply a hackneyed platitude. The complexity of modern transnational problems presents the real potential that increasingly authoritative international governance may be a functional necessity for
some issues. The essential debate, therefore, will probably focus on the appropri-

ate scope, form and limits of authoritative international decision-making and not
on its existence.
56 See, e.g., Vicki Jackson, Narratives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Compara-

tive Constitutional Experience, 51

DUKE

L.J. 223 (2001).
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legitimacy critiques of international governance raise fundamental questions about the appropriate locus of decision-making
authority.
It is ironic that the rising importance of democratic governance within international law has been accompanied by a growing public perception that international governance itself is a
counterforce that limits democratic expression. It is, therefore,
vital that international organizations develop processes and institutional structures that properly account for, endorse, and respect domestic democratic self-governance. As detailed below,
this may be particularly important for the international human
rights system, which is often confronted with immensely complex
and highly contested moral issues that lie at the heart of democratic self-rule.

IV.

THE MEANING OF DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY

Domestic acceptance of increasingly authoritative international decision-making in human rights will undoubtedly depend,
in significant part, upon the democratic pedigree of such decisions. Is it possible to develop non-controversial criteria for evaluating the democratic legitimacy of current and future human
rights decision-making? What do people mean when they speak
about democratic legitimacy?
Many critiques of international governance essentially rely
on democracy as the sole criterion of institutional legitimacy.
Often legitimacy is no more than a loose rhetorical adjective
rather than a concrete legal or political concept. Clearly it may
mean different things to different people in different contexts.58
51 See infra notes 170-77, 183-86 and accompanying text.

5' Concepts of legitimacy have long been critical to the work of social and political
theorists ranging from Max Weber to Jurgen Habermas. See generally Allan
Hyde, The Concept of Legitimization in the Sociology of Law, 1983 Wis. L. REV.
379, 387-89, 392-93, 397, 423 (1983) (reviewing and critiquing theories concerning
the role of "legitimacy" in fostering compliance with domestic legal norms). See
also John Yoo, 2001 Symposium: Bush v. Gore, In Defense of the Court's Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (2001) (reviewing various uses of legitimacy concepts); Tom Tyler and Gregory Mitchell, Legitimacy and the Empowerment of
Discretionary Legal Authority: The United States Supreme Court and Abortion
Rights, 43 DUKE L.J. 703 (1994) (providing a detailed analysis of legitimacy concepts as applied to the abortion decisions). Legitimacy has also figured prominently in international law discourse. See generally THOMAS FRANCK, THE
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For present purposes, however, it is enough to understand "democratic legitimacy" as a conclusion that a particular exercise of
authority is justified in light of shared democratic ideals. 9 Legitimacy in this sense requires not only a formal legal mandate appropriately created and exercised, but also acceptance of the
process and its outcomes by those being governed.' Political and
popular acceptance may be prompted by a variety of considerations including: perceptions of fair process, deference to expertise, meaningful opportunities for participation, adequate
representation of diverse interests, transparency, and consistency
in decision-making over time.6' It also undoubtedly depends on
substantive outcomes that are generally consistent with the dominant cultural, political and moral sensibilities of the society in
question.62 Similarly, the perceived legitimacy of an institution
depends on public belief that the institution is, in process and
OF LEGITIMACY AMONG NATIONS (1990) (focusing on the role of legitimacy in explaining state compliance with international legal norms); Oscar
Schacter, Towards a Theory of International Obligation, 8 VA. J. INT'L L. 300,
311-12, 314 (1968); Jose Alvarez, The Quest for Legitimacy: An Examination of
The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations, 24 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 199, 24243 (1991); Phillip R. Trimble, A Revisionist View of Customary InternationalLaw,
33 UCLA L. REV. 665, 716-31 (1986); Caron, supra note 50, at 556-61.
5 The concept of legitimacy has many permutations and possible meanings. See
generally Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 58. See also Yoo, supra note 58, at 777-83;
Bodansky, supra note 16, at 600-06, 612-13. Professor Bodansky has aptly noted
that democratic attributes are only one possible measure of legitimacy. Id. at 599600, 620-23. Many critics of international governance have ignored such subtleties focusing instead on a more central and basic question-do the decision-making processes and decisions of international organizations exhibit those
characteristics of democracy which might justify their exercises of authority. See
supra notes 1-2, 16, 28-29, 35-36 and accompanying text.
6oSee, e.g., Weiler, supra note 16, at 2468-70; Bodansky, supra note 16, at 600-06,
612-13, 620-23; Yoo, supra note 58, at 777-83
61 See, e.g., Yoo, supra note 58, at 777-83; Tyler & Mitchell, supra note 58, at 712-15,
733-41, 747-51. See also THOMAS M FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
AND INSTITUTIONS, 7, 22, 25-26 (1995) (equating "legitimacy," inter alia, with procedural fairness, utilitarianism, a desire for order, and right process).
62This point is often emphasized by non-western human rights advocates. See, e.g.,
A. An-Naim, What Do We Mean by Universal?, 4/5 Index on Censorship 120
(1994); A. al-Hibri, Islam, Law and Custom: Redefining Muslim Women's Rights,
12 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1, 3-4 (1997) (describing the importance of developing human rights norms consistently with cultural imperatives); Daniel Bell,
The East Asian Challenge to Human Rights; Reflections on an East-West Dialogue, 18 HUM. RTS. Q. 641, 656-60 (1996). From a primarily functional perspective, there is also reason to believe that the effectiveness of human rights
ultimately depends, at some level, on their consistency with the prevailing social,
POWER
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action, representative of basic values shared in that society over
issues of equality, liberty, justice, tradition, community and personal freedom.63 Ultimately, most of the factors relating to democratic pedigree and character may be seen as coalescing in a
public perception that an institution and its decisions are fairly
made, representative, responsive and alterable.
As further described below, questions exist concerning both
the formal and perceived (political and popular) democratic legitimacy of present and future international human rights governance.'
On the formal level, there is little doubt that
international human rights institutions have been properly created and entrusted with some degree of legal authority pursuant
to the adoption and approval of their constitutive treaties.
Rather, the potential controversy over formal legitimacy will
concern the proper scope of their legal mandate and limitations
on the domestic legal status of their decision-making.6 5 Recent
controversies over the authority of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights' Human Rights Committee (HRC)
to dictate limits on reservations and withdrawals are initial
examples.66
I believe, however, that the primary thrust of democratic legitimacy concerns for future international human rights governance will more likely focus on the political or socially perceived
legitimacy of international institutions rather than their formal
legal mandate. 67 As the authority of human rights institutions
cultural and religious traditions of the society in which they are to be applied. See
Donoho, Autonomy, supra note 3, at 422.
6 See Weiler, supra note 16, at 2469. Modern societies are a complex mixture of
competing social and moral values. Thus, for example, every modern society undoubtedly values both individual autonomy and community. Different societies,
however, manifest such values with differing emphasis and priorities. Such differences may result in very different conclusions regarding the proper balance between individual rights and community interests, and produce varying substantive
outcomes in concrete cases, particularly in the application of amorphous concepts
such as privacy or highly contested moral issues. See infra notes 170-77, 189 and

accompanying text.
'

See infra notes 65-72 and accompanying text.

65 See infra notes 66, 94, 104-105, 112, 139-44 and accompanying text.

See Donoho, supra note 3, at 430 n. 110 (describing the debate over the HRC's
assertion of authority over the validity of reservations in General Comment 24);
infra note 112 and accompanying text.
67 See infra notes 155-78 and accompanying text.
6
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grows, important questions will arise concerning the degree to
which their decision-making is, or may become, sufficiently consistent with and supportive of the ideals of democratic self-governance. Thus, democratic critiques of international human
rights governance will likely measure institutional legitimacy in
terms of the existence or non-existence of critical democratic attributes and perceived consistency with the needs of authentic
democratic self-governance.
These considerations are not, of course, the only important
measures of institutional legitimacy. It is important to recognize
that other measures of legitimacy, such as functionality, political
independence, and expertise, may reasonably be seen as critical
for many human rights problems. 6 In particular, expertise and
independence may be vital to effective enforcement of international human rights standards against oppressive governments.6 9
As described further below, however, such alternative measures
of institutional legitimacy may sometimes pose troubling implications for democracy, depending on the stress one places on majoritarianism and the locus of decision-making. 0
More
importantly, in light of the international communities' new enthusiasm for democracy, no measure of legitimacy seems as vital
to the future shape of international human rights decision-making as the attributes of democratic self-governance. Democratic
rule may have already become the international talisman for the
legitimacy of government itself.7 This is, of course, a value judgment that will not be shared by all.
68Most democracies have many decidedly undemocratic institutions that are deeply

involved in governance. The United States Federal Reserve Board and European Central Bank, for example, have been purposefully isolated from traditional
democratic controls in favor of political independence and functional effectiveness. Similarly, the United States federal judiciary, with a Constitutional guarantee of lifetime tenure and the self-allocated power of judicial review, is commonly
assailed as an undemocratic institution. See infra notes 117-125 and accompanying text. Although some would undoubtedly disagree, it seems beyond serious
question that all of these institutions enjoy, despite undemocratic characteristics,
widely accepted "legal legitimacy" in both formal authority and general public
perception.
69See infra notes 113-14, 126, 132-33 and accompanying text (discussing the com-

peting values of judicial resolution of human rights issues).
'0 See infra notes 154-86 and accompanying text.
71 See supra notes 22 and 24.
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From this view, international human rights institutions may
best achieve legitimacy if they identify and account for core principles essential to the various forms of democratic governance.
The decisions of international human rights organizations are
more likely to enjoy acceptance if they derive from institutional
structures and decision-making processes that are consistent
with, and not disruptive of, democratic self-governance. Such
criteria are not, however, only useful for evaluating and enhancing the democratic legitimacy of international decision-making
processes. Such criteria also help to evaluate and respond to the
more extreme claim that international decision-making over certain issues, even if perfectly democratic in process and form, nevertheless disrupts core democratic values by usurping decisions
more appropriately made by local or national communities.72
This raises basic questions about what criteria might be used
to enhance the democratic legitimacy of human rights organizations. There is, of course, no singularly accepted version of genuine democracy.73 Democracies come in a variety of forms and
reflect the distinct viewpoints of the world's diverse communities.
Democratic rule may be more or less direct, proportional, parliamentary, representative or decentralized. It may emphasize legislative supremacy or not.74 The strongly anti-majoritarian

n See supra notes 35-36, 53-55 and accompanying text.
7 See generally HELD, supra note 2; ROBERT DAHL, ON DEMOCRACY 3-4, 36-37,
119-24, 136-41 (Yale Univ. Press 1998); Brad Roth, Evaluating Democratic Progress, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Fox & Nolte
eds., 2000). See also R. Ezethan, The Right to Democracy: A Qualitative Inquiry,
22 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 495, 502-03, 513-14 (1997); Bruce Ackerman, The New
Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633 (2000): Gregory Fox & George
Nolte, IntolerantDemocracies, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE, supra at 389, 40621. As explained below, the existence of differing approaches to democratic governance may have special significance in the context of international human
rights, which often involve fundamental questions regarding majority rule, individual rights and restrictions on government. See infra notes 170-77, 189 and accompanying text.
14 See, e.g., HELD, supra note 2, at 33, 55, 61, 99, 116, 152-53, 157-58,
197, 217-18,
358-59 (providing brief summaries of major variations);
DEMOCRATIC THEORY

DAHL, PREFACE TO

4-7, 36-51 (Univ. Chicago Press 1956); Steven Crowley,

The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI.
L. REV. 689, 701-12, (1995) (providing a clear description of the basic tensions
between majoritarianism and individual rights in constitutional democracies).
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structure of American constitutional democracy, with its emphasis on separation of powers, federalism and a powerful independent judiciary, is hardly the only model for authentic democratic
governance.75 Indeed, even within American society, the balance
between individual and majoritarian interests, and the appropriate role of government institutions in democracy, remain contested and evolving political issues.
There are, of course, important implications to these differences. The most important of these concern choices regarding the
relationship between the majority and individuals or minorities,
and the appropriate role and authority of various government institutions.76 Societies with a more communal orientation, or
those favoring legislative supremacy and a greater emphasis on
majority rule, may evaluate the requirements for democratic legitimacy in international decision-making differently.77 This is
particularly true with regard to dispute resolution in human
rights and the potential evolution of institutional powers similar
to judicial review.78
In a world of profound diversity, are there fundamental
characteristics of democratic governance that can be usefully
identified? Despite the varied manifestations of democracy, it
seems likely that such core characteristics do exist. Abraham
" See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 73;

DAHL,

supra note 73, at 119-24, 136-41.

76See infra notes 170-77 and accompanying text. See also DAHL, supra note 74 at 1-

32.
See infra notes 84, 170-73, 189 and accompanying text. Many African and Asian
societies tend to define human rights through a more communal perspective than
their Western counterparts. Much of the early literature regarding "non-western" orientations towards human rights focused on social, economic and political
preferences regarding the role of individuals in society and in relationship to government. This literature emphasizes, for example, socialistic economic relations,
the importance of duties, society's collective interests, "group" oriented social
relations and a rejection of traditional liberal notions of rights dominated by individual autonomy. See, e.g., J. COPPER, F. MICHAEL & Y. Wu, HUMAN RiGrs IN
POST-MAO CHINA 67-71 (John Copper, et al., eds., 1985); T. CAMPBELL, THE
LEFT AND RIGHTS: A CONCEPTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE IDEA OF SOCIALIST
RIGHTS, 2-11, 103-22 (1983); A. Legesse, Human Rights in African Political Culture, in THE MORAL IMPERATIVES OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A WORLD SURVEY 12324, 128-30 (K. Thompson ed., 1980).
78See infra notes 170-77, 189 and accompanying text. As further developed below,
"

questions about the democratic legitimacy of judicial review in American constitutional law revolve around a conception of liberal democracy that is strongly
anti-majoritarian in nature. See infra note 126.
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Lincoln famously described democracy as government "of the
people, by the people and for the people." This simple aphorism,
perhaps never accurate in practice, captures the core concept of
democratic rule in all of its manifestations. At the heart of the
democratic concept lies the core value of self-rule by a shared
community of people."0
Self-rule does not, of course, necessarily require direct democracy. It does, however, suggest the necessary attributes for
popular empowerment-meaningful opportunities to participate
and be heard, the ability to change representation and reject policies through periodic elections, and reasonably transparent deliberative processes.8 Thus, authentic democracies inevitably
include mechanisms to engender: (a), accountability and responsiveness of decision-makers to those being governed (typically
through genuine periodic elections); (b) broad-based representation of different social interests; (c) access to government officials and processes; (d) transparency in decision-making and
dispute resolution processes; (e) freedom to organize and express
political opinion; (f) access to information; and, (g) the potential
for democratic revision (processes for popular rejection of prior
rule-making) .81
Also ubiquitous to modern democracy are institutional safeguards that provide checks on the exercise of power. Most importantly for human rights, these typically include constraints on
majoritarian rule which protect the interests of minority groups
9 See, e.g., DAHL, supra note 73, at 35-36; HELD, MODELS, supra note 2, at 352-53,
337-38 (describing challenges to this concept posed by global "interconnected2 (U.S.
ness") See also supra notes 25-26. See The Declaration of Independence
1776) ("Governments... [derive] their just powers from the consent of the governed..."); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217/ art. 21.
8 See DAHL, supra note 74, at 34-36, 67-84; HELD, supra note 2, at 177-82. See also
Mark Graber, The Law Professor as Populist, 34 U. RICH. L. REV. 373, 391-94
(2000) (describing variations in democratic theory regarding participation and
populism); Lino Graglia, Revitalizing Democracy, 24 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y
165 (2000) (arguing in favor of decentralized democratic practices such as direct
referendum and against judicial review); Richard Parker, Power to the Voters, 24
HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 179 (2000) (summarizing trend toward populism in
modern democratic constitutional thinking); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS
81

See, e.g.,

DAHL,

34-36,67-84;

(Princeton Univ. Press, 1998).

supra note 73, at 37-43, 84-99;

HELD,

supra note 2, at 118-20.

DAHL, PREFACE,

supra note 74, at
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and individuals. 2 The strength of such safeguards and specific
human rights outcomes may vary among democratic societies depending upon the balance struck between competing interests.
Variations in the degree to which democratic societies choose to
constrain the "tyranny of the majority" must be considered in
evaluating the democratic implications of international human
rights decision-making.83 Such decision-making could, for example, conceivably develop the system's current anti-majoritarian
premises in ways that displace or disrupt divergent domestic approaches to this balance of interests. 4 This important consideration is further elaborated upon below.
In summary, concerns over the democratic legitimacy of international governance, described generally above, seem to rest
primarily on the coalescence of the following factors:
(1) the degree to which an institution has the capacity for
authoritative rule creation, either through direct means or indirectly in the form of dispute resolution and interpretation of indeterminate norms;

' Seee.g., DAHL, supra note 74, at 36.
See infra notes 170-77 and accompanying text.

13

The international human rights system clearly reflects a Western ideological heritage, which is generally designed to trump majority rule in favor of certain individual liberties. See generally, Makau wa Mutua, The Ideology of Human Rights,
36 VA. J. INT'L L. 589, 605-06 (1996). See also Bihari Kausikan, Asia's Different
Standard, 92 FOR. POL'Y 24 (1993); Amanda Pollis & Peter Schwab, Human
Rights: A Western Construct with Limited Application, in HUMAN RIGHTS: CULTURAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES

1-14 (A. Pollis & P. Schwab eds., 1979);

Raimundo Pannikkar, Is the Notion of Human Rights a Western Concept?, DioGENES 120, 75-102 (1982). Some academics have unabashedly embraced this western, liberal orientation as a superior model for improving the human condition.
See, e.g., Jack Donnelly, Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique
of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights, 76 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 303 (1982).
These commentators suggest that Western notions about rights are functionally
required to limit the oppressive power of the modern, industrialized, bureaucratic
state. See, e.g., id. at 311-12; Rhoda Howard, Dignity, Community and Human
Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: A QUEST FOR
CONSENSUS 81 (Abdullahi An-Na'im ed., 1992). See also Reza Afshari, An Essay
on Islamic Cultural Relativism in the Discourse of Human Rights, 16 HUM. RTS.
Q. 235, 248-52 (1994); Thomas Franck, Is Personal Freedom a Western Value?, 91
AM. J. INT'L L. 593, 624-27 (1997). But see, Samuel Huntington, The West:
Unique, Not Universal, 1996 FOREIGN AFF. 28, 29-35, 37 (Nov/Dec) (refuting the
idea that modernity requires the universalization of Western culture).
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(2) the potential that such internationally generated outcomes may displace domestically produced democratic preferences (either directly via legal supremacy, or indirectly as a result
of negative consequences when the international rule is not complied with);
(3) an institutional deficiency in democratic attributes (accountability, responsiveness, broad-based representation of interests, fair and transparent processes of deliberation, checks and
balances and some meaningful connection between decisionmakers and those governed);" and,
(4) a potentially wide scope of jurisdictional authority creating the possibility that international decisions may invade subjects traditionally, or more appropriately, left to national or local
democratic discretion.
The coalescence of these factors, in different degrees for different institutions, gives rise to potentially profound implications
for the future of international governance and the continuing development of international solutions for transnational problems.
The wider an institution's scope of authority and jurisdiction, the
more pronounced its potential implications for domestic democratic processes.
The remainder of this paper focuses on evaluating the democratic legitimacy of current and future international decisionmaking by the human rights system's developing institutions. To
what degree are the factors described above reflected in the existing system? What forms of future international governance in
human rights present concerns for democratic self-governance?
Does respect for democratic values suggest limits on international decision-making in human rights? Perhaps most importantly, what do concerns regarding democratic legitimacy imply
about the future evolution of international human rights
institutions?
In order to evaluate such questions, it is necessary to trace
out the manner in which the human rights system currently renders its decisions and how that output may affect domestic policy
choices. The questions involved are complicated somewhat by

" See infra notes 101-03, 110-11, 150-177 and accompanying text.
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the wide range of institutional arrangements and relative immaturity of the international system . 6 Similarly, as explained below,
there are competing models of international human rights "governance" reflected in the existing system. The evolution of these
models, which may be loosely characterized as promotional versus enforcement oriented regimes, will shape the future function
of human rights institutions.87
The following section briefly describes the typical decisionmaking processes of important human rights institutions and
their legal status. It also details the ways such decisions may become legally authoritative within domestic legal systems or create other consequences relevant to democratic choice.
Subsequent sections evaluate the democratic credentials of these
international decision-making processes and trace out their potential implications for domestic democracy. This discussion tentatively identifies the various ways in which future, more
authoritative international governance over highly contested
moral issues may present problematic implications for democratic self-governance.
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS DECISION-MAKING

V.

PROCESSES

Concern about the democratic legitimacy of international
governance is most pronounced when unaccountable or unrepresentative international decision-makers have the capacity to generate rules and decisions that are, in some sense, binding or
authoritative within domestic legal systems. Thus, an initial consideration regarding the democratic legitimacy of human rights
6 Judicial or quasi-judicial institutions, for example, arguably raise special concerns
for democratic self-governance analogous to the persistent debate over judicial
review that is de rigueur in U.S. constitutional law. Monitoring functions and the
work of overtly political institutions like the U.N. Commission on Human Rights,
in contrast, raise far different issues. See infra notes 94-116 and accompanying

text.
87 The

simultaneous operation of differing approaches to human rights law compli-

cates the evaluation of their implications for democracy. For example, the degree
to which one considers the primary function of human rights institutions to be

promotion versus enforcement may significantly affect the perceived need for authoritative international institutions and one's view on the primacy of national
implementation of human rights standards. See infra notes 94, 144-46 and accompanying text.
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decision-making is the existing and future capacity of human
rights institutions to generate binding rules and decisions that
may displace domestic democratic preferences.
In terms of basic normative structure, the current international human rights system is relatively well-developed in a series
of major multilateral treaties covering a wide array of subjects.'
In recent years, these basic treaty texts have been widely
adopted.89 The process by which such norms are created and approved typically presents little conflict with democratic self-governance. The basic treaty texts are commonly negotiated by state
representatives who, while somewhat removed from the fray of
democratic politics, are theoretically accountable members of the
executive branch. More importantly, the requirement that each
state give its consent to the treaty text through its domestic
processes should satisfy any concerns over the democratic legitimacy of the basic international obligations created, at least in
functioning democracies.9 °
Over the past fifty years, the international community has generated a comprehensive network of general human rights standards, primarily set forth as inchoate abstractions in multilateral treaties. These treaties comprehensively cover
civil and political rights (ICCPR, supra note 23), economic and social rights (International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 993 U.N.T.S. 3,
[ICESCR]), racial discrimination (CERD, supra note 23, 660 U.N.T.S. 195), gender discrimination (Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [CEDAW]), torture (Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, G.A.
Res. 46, U.N. GAOR, 391h Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc. A/Res/39/46
(1984)[CAT]) and children's rights (Convention on the Rights of the Child, G.A.
Res. 25, U.N. GAOR 44'h Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. A/RES/44/25 (1989)
[Children's Convention]). See Douglas Donoho, The Role of Human Rights in
Global Security Issues: A Normative and Institutional Critique, 14 MICH. J. INT'L
L. 827, 847-50, 859-68 (1993).
89Among the hundreds of international human rights instruments promulgated
under U.N. authority since 1945, there are at least 7 major multilateral treaties,
with over 100 states parties each. The ICESCR, ICCPR, and conventions on
Genocide, Racial Discrimination, Women, Torture and Children have 142, 144,

130, 156, 165, 119, and 191 states parties, respectively. See

MILLENNIUM SUMMIT

MULTILATERAL TREATY FRAMEWORK, Sept. 6-8, 2000, U.N. Doc. DPI/2130.

90State consent, manifested through ratification or other domestic process, is fundamental to the creation of a binding international human rights treaty obligation. See MARK JANIS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 16-20 (Ist ed.
1988); Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, adopted May 22, 1969, art. 34
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.39/27, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 679, 693 (1969). Customary international law obligations, in contrast, are not strictly based upon affirmative
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Most conventional international human right norms, however, are stated in abstract and general terms." For most rights,
particularly those commonly implicated in controversial moral
and social issues such as privacy, equal protection, due process
and freedom of speech, it is impossible to determine specific contextual meaning based on a reading of the text alone.' Like all
legal rules, international human rights norms are subject to an
inherent degree of ambiguity, subjectivity and indeterminate
meaning.93 Given the textual indeterminacy and malleable nature of these rights, the critical questions concern the process by
state consent. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States, § 102, cmt. b-d (1987); infra note 139.
91There are good and practical reasons why most international human rights are
expressed in very general and abstract terms. See Donoho, supra note 88, at 839.
Such abstraction provides flexibility and allows diverse states with divergent
views on the specific meaning of rights to join international human rights treaties
in the first instance. Agreement over such abstract and generally stated norms
tells us very little about the actual depth of agreement over what those rights will
mean to different societies in their concrete manifestations. The most significant
implications for democratic self-governance arise from the process of developing
the specific meaning of inchoate human rights norms and their eventual implementation as authoritative law with concrete applications within domestic
systems.
The specific manifestation of most international human rights is still unsettled.
See Donoho, supra note 3, at 428-31. See also Michael Perry, Normative Indeterminacy and the Problem of JudicialRole, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 375, 382-83
(1996); Henry Steiner, Book Review of INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A
NUTSHELL, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 603, 604-05 (1990): Donoho, supra note 88, at 83743, 847-50. The specific meaning of many human rights remains underdeveloped.
Reasons for this include the relative newness of the norms and the international
system's limited capacity for rendering authoritative interpretations of rights. See
id. at 866-68.
13

See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. See also Martin Koskenniemi, The
Future of Statehood, 32 HARV. INT'L L.J. 397, 399-400, 405-06 (1991); Mark
Tushnet, An Essay on Rights, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1363, 1371-1382 (1984); Henry
Steiner, PoliticalParticipationas a Human Right, 1 HARV. HUM. RTS. Y.B. 77-86
(1989); Donoho, supra note 3, at 839-47; Philip Alston, The Best Interests Principle: Towards A Reconciliation of Culture and Human Rights, 8 INT'L J.L. & FAM.
1, 18 (1994). Although the textual indeterminacy of rights stated solely in abstract terms is manifest, a significant measure of concrete meaning may be added
through the process of interpretation and application. See infra notes 94-100 and
accompanying text. There is, however, a deeper level of indeterminacy that surrounds all legal concepts, even after generations of exegesis by sophisticated legal
processes. Thus, rights discourse in the United States has included a significant
challenge to liberalism's reliance on rights as an instrument of constructive social
change based, at least in part, on their inherent indeterminacy. See, e.g., Tushnet,
infra note 93 at 1363-94. See generally Anthony Chase, The Left on Rights: An
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which these general inchoate obligations are given specific meaning and may bind domestic polities in concrete ways. Two methods for developing the concrete specific meaning of abstract
norms stand out for present purposes: (1) monitoring, supervisory and promotional activities by international institutions; and,
(2) application and interpretation by international judicial or
quasi-judicial dispute settlement mechanisms. Each of these
processes is described briefly below. 4
A.

INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISORY, MONITORING AND
PROMOTIONAL FUNCTIONS

International supervision and scrutiny of human rights plays
a critical function that lies at the heart of the international system. International human rights are fundamentally designed to
create an external check on the potential abuses that governments have historically imposed on their own citizenry.' While
Introduction, 62 TEX. L.
ques of rights).

REV.

1541, 1553-61 (1984) (summarizing distinct criti-

94A less obvious, but perhaps important, mechanism for developing the meaning of
general human rights norms occurs when the states themselves take seriously
their basic obligation of national implementation. The international system is
generally premised on the primacy of national implementation of rights. See, e.g.,
Christine Cerna, East Asian Approaches To Human Rights, 2 BuFF. J. INT'L L.
201, 210 (1996); Jack Donnelly, International Human Rights: A Regime Analysis,
40 IrNT'L ORG. 599, 613-15 (1986). See also Certain Aspects of the Laws on the
Use of Languages in Education in Belgium, 1 EHRR 252, 284 (A/6) (1968) (convention mechanisms are subsidiary to national implementation of rights). Although subject to international review and scrutiny, each state party currently
enjoys significant interpretive discretion in their initial implementation of the
rights. See Donoho, supra note 3, at 431-32. Despite this, the locus of final interpretive authority over the meaning of rights is more ambiguous. If each state's
own decisions about the appropriate meaning of rights were conclusive, there
would be little concern for the democratic pedigree and authenticity of international human rights standards. On the other hand, one might reasonably question the purpose of international standards under such conditions. Human rights
outcomes would vary considerably among nations and the central benefits of internationalizing human rights would be diluted. See Douglas Donoho, Relativism
Versus Universalism in Human Rights: The Search For Meaningful Standards, 27
STAN. J. INT'L L. 345, 356-60 (1991). Presumably there is, therefore, some form
of shared authority to interpret the specific meaning of rights between domestic
and international institutions. As described below, the precise contours of this
shared authority are poorly defined, potentially controversial and still evolving.
See infra notes 144-46 and accompanying text.
9 See Louis HENKIN, THE RIGHTS OF MAN TODAY 29-30 (Westview Press, 1978);
Richard Bilder, An Overview of InternationalHuman Rights Law, in GUIDE TO
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the precise contours of this function are the subject of continuing
debate,96 the internationalization of human rights implies, at min-

imum, that the international community and its institutions are to
play some significant role in determining the ultimate meaning of

rights.' This function is primarily served by international organizations, which supervise, monitor, promote and enforce the inchoate obligations contained in treaty texts. These international
processes provide a potentially critical layer of concrete meaning
to human rights standards. It is here that potentially authoritative international legal rules and decisions regarding human

rights are developed. The critical considerations concern the authority of such decision-makers and their interpretive output in
relation to domestic legal processes and national implementation

of the rights. This, in turn, will vary among international institutions depending upon their mandate.
Essentially the offspring of states, it is not surprising that
most international human rights organizations are currently limited to supervisory or monitoring roles rather than judicial or

quasi-judicial functions. Many of the major international human
rights treaties create institutional "committees" of experts.9"
These committees of experts invariably have a relatively constricted mandate typically consisting of monitoring and promotional activities, such as reviewing state prepared reports on
national implementation and offering "general comments."99
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 3, 3-9 (H. Hannum ed., 1984). See also Jack
Donnelly, Human Rights and Human Dignity: An Analytic Critique of Non-Western Conceptions of Human Rights, 76 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 303, 311-12 (1982).
96See Donoho, supra note 3, at 430 n. 110 (describing the debate over the HRC's
assertion of authority over the validity of reservations in General Comment 24);
supra notes 94, 144-46.
9 See supra note 94.
See generally Donoho, supra note 88, at 859-62. There are currently six major
treaty-based monitoring institutions operating in cooperation with the United
Nations system. Each of these "committees" is entrusted with monitoring state
compliance with the rights recognized in their respective treaty texts.
See generally Torkel Opsahl, The Human Rights Committee, in THE UNITED NATIONS AND

HUMAN

RIGHTS:

A

CRITICAL APPRAISAL

(P. Alston ed., 1992);

Donoho, supra note 88, at 859-62; S. Coliver & A. Miller, InternationalReporting
Procedures, in

GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE

at Ch. 10

(177-201) (H. Hannum ed. 1994) (summarizing reporting procedures under each
of the six major multilateral treaties); A. Byrnes, The "Other" Human Rights
Treaty Body: The Work of the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination
Against Women, 14 YALE J. INT'L L. 1, 42-51 (1989) (describing the use of general
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Some institutions, such as the Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights and the HRC, have both quasi-judicial and supervisory functions within their mandate."°
On the one hand, it is clear that international human rights
institutions with supervisory or monitoring functions lack certain
democratic attributes. One might reasonably complain, for example, that the treaty-based committees are generally composed
of unaccountable elite, chosen by national executive branches
with no electoral or other meaningful connection to the populations whose rights are being addressed.10' More critically perhaps, the norms that they supervise are, by their nature,
comments by various treaty bodies). The major multilateral treaties also provide
moribund inter-state complaint procedures that have never been invoked.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, which must be distinguished
...
from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, has been empowered by the
OAS to serve monitoring functions under the OAS Charter and the American
Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. The Commission also serves a
quasi-judicial function, along with the Inter-American Court, under the InterAmerican Convention on Human Rights. See Cecilia Medina, The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of Human
Rights: Reflections on a Joint Venture, 12 HuM. RTS. Q. 439 (1990); V. Rodriguez
& M. Seitles, The Development of the Inter-American Human Rights System: A
HistoricalPerspective and A Modern-Day Critique, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS.
593 (2000). See generally GUIDE To HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE, supra note 99, at
Chs. 7-9. The Human Rights Committee is entrusted with the usual array of
monitoring activities by the ICCPR. See generally Donoho, supra note 88; DOMINIC McGOLDRICK, THE HUMAN

RIGHTS COMMITTEE (Oxford

Univ. Press

1991). It also has quasi-judicial functions under the ICCPR's Optional Protocol.
Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
999 U.N.T.S. 171(302-46). See generally McGoldrick, supra. See also Mutua,
supra note 3, at 245-52. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination created by CERD, supra note 88, at art. 14, and the Committee Against
Torture created by CAT, supra note 88, at art. 22, also have quasi-judicial functions that have, to date, been modest in scope and effect. See generally INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT

(Philip Alston & Henry Steiner eds., 1996)

at 560-61. See also infra note 112. Significant efforts have been made to create a
similar petitioning system under CEDAW. See, e.g., A. Byrne & J. Connors, Enforcing the Human Rights of Women: A Complaints Procedurefor the Women's
Convention?, 21 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 679 (1996). The General Assembly officially
adopted the text of the Optional Protocol to CEDAW in October, 1999. G.A.
54th Sess., Agenda Item 109, U.N. Doc. A/Res/54/4 (1999). As of June, 2000, five
states had ratified the Protocol. See MILLENNIUM SUMMIT, supra note 89, at 28.
l01 By the terms of the treaties they monitor, committee experts are generally selected for renewable terms by vote of the states parties based upon minimal selection criteria. Selection of the 18 HRC experts under the ICCPR is illustrative.
The treaty itself merely requires that candidates for the committee have "recognized competence" in human rights and that states consider the "usefulness" of

Vol 21, No. I

Democratic Legitimacy in Human Rights

33

indeterminate and underdeveloped, allowing these experts significant interpretive flexibility. As explained below, it is often argued that unaccountable decision-makers are most problematic
for democracy when they lack objective criteria for interpreting
and applying indeterminate standards. 02 Complaints may be
raised, therefore, that any particular standard articulated by such
supervisory bodies is not authentically democratic since it is not
derived from a process responsive to the polity concerned.1 "3
On the other hand, although the treaty-based committees
may lack certain democratic attributes, complaints about the
democratic legitimacy of their monitoring work are significantly
tempered by the committees' limited authority and function.
States have uniformly been unwilling to give international human
rights institutions binding authority as a part of the treaty-based

prior "legal experience." See, e.g., ICCPR, supra note 94, at Art. 28. While experts serve in their personal capacity, they simultaneously continue their full-time
occupations, including government appointments. See Henry Steiner, Individual
Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What Role for the Human Rights Committee? in THE FUTURE OF THE U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS TREATY MONITORING 2829 (Alston & Crawford eds., 2000) [hereinafter Treaty Monitoring]; Andrew
Clapham, UN Human Rights Reporting Procedures: An NGO Perspective, in
TREATY MONITORING, supra at 188. See also Mutua, Enforcement, supra note 3,
at 222-23 (doubting the actual independence of experts from the state that nominates them). It appears that virtually all countries entrust responsibility for selecting and voting on candidates exclusively to their executive branch of government.
Nor are candidates subjected to any deliberative democratic review process. C.f
Clapham, supra at 189 (noting that even interested NGO's are not generally
given a candidate's curriculum vitae prior to election). Similarly, election of the
experts takes place at the UN, among a mass of other elective posts, and is subject to inevitable political considerations and vote trading. See James Crawford,
The UN Human Rights Treaty System: A System in Crisis?,in TREATY MONITORING, supra at 1, 4-5, 9 (also describing the election process as "haphazard" with
"limited account of qualifications"); Clapham, supra at 188-89. The political nature of the process, according to one observer, precludes a "uniformly high quality" among committee experts. See Steiner, supra at 42. One might, of course,
see the absence of democratic checks as a positive attribute since it isolates committee members from the pressures of popular political controversy or public
opinion. See infra note 113-14.
'02 See infra notes 120, 179-80 and accompanying text.
also infra notes 150-69 and accompanying text. Although committee deliberative processes are not generally very transparent, well publicized or accessible to
the public, there has been significant improvement in this regard resulting from
the persistent work of NGO's. See, e.g., Steiner, supra note 101, at 36, 38-39.

103See
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monitoring processes."°4 Indeed, although not without some controversy, it does not appear that states generally consider committee interpretations of rights resulting from their supervisory
functions as authoritative in any sense." 5 Perhaps reflecting this,
the committees have, in general, taken a "promotional" approach to their monitoring functions that favors "persuasion"
and "dialogue" with the state rather than pretending to dictate
particular results. Consequently, committee views have no binding domestic legal effect, little practical consequence and may be
easily resisted if contrary to domestic democratic preferences. In
essence, supervisory and monitoring decisions by international
institutions, as currently constituted, have limited potential for
disrupting domestic democratic preferences. Democratic polities
may choose to follow international institutional leadership, or
not, according to domestic preferences. In general, this pattern is
consistent with the promotional model of international human
rights governance that dominates the treaty-based processes.
However, to the extent that the monitoring work of the treaty-

04

Committee views during the reporting process are not technically binding under

the terms of the respective treaties. See, e.g., ICCPR supra note 23, at Art. 40.
Nor are such views given direct legal effect in domestic legal systems. See
Steiner, supra note 101, at 50-52. Indeed, neither committee views regarding state
reports nor general comments are presented in forms that facilitate direct incorporation. See Opsahl, supra note 99, at 412-414, 415 (former member of the HRC
noting that general comments are "neither scholarly studies nor secondary legislative acts" and that their generality may cause "problems of application to spe"). Nor do either address specific individual violations of rights.
cific cases ..
See Coliver & Miller, supra note 99; Opsahl, supra note 99, at 412-415.
o See Donoho, supra note 3, at 430 n.110 (describing the controversy over the
HRC's adoption of General Comment 24 regarding state reservations and the
explicit rejection by the United States, the United Kingdom and France of such
interpretive authority). See also Coliver & Miller, supra note 99, at 188 ("countries routinely fail to implement committee recommendations"). There is ample
evidence that governments have yet to take the preparation, presentation and
dialogue over state reports very seriously. Mutua, Enforcement, supra note 3, at
228-29. Apparent disrespect for the reporting process is reflected in the extremely
poor performance of states in preparing and timely submitting reports. See Anne
Bayefsky, 91 ASIL PROC. 460, 467 (1997). But see Martin O'Flaherty, The Reporting Obligation Under Article 40 of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights: Lessons to be Learned from Consideration by the HRC of Ireland's First Report, 16 HUM. RTS. Q. 515 (1994) (suggesting that under "favorable
conditions", the reporting process can be "productive").
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based expert committees should become more authoritative, additional concerns for democratic self-governance, as described
below, should be addressed.1"
B.

JUDICIAL AND QUASI-JUDICIAL FUNCTIONS

The developing judicial and quasi-judicial functions of international human rights institutions present more critical potential
implications for democracy. There are three such institutions of
some prominence: the Inter-American Court of Human Rights
(IACHR); 7 the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR); °8
and the HRC. 1°9 While there are differences among these institutions in their basic processes, mandates and authority, each provides a means for redressing individual complaints that a
government has violated its obligations under an international

human rights treaty.
The judges or experts who serve on these bodies are not
elected by popular vote or otherwise directly accountable to the

'06
See infra notes 137-86 and accompanying text.
17 See su

note 100.

108
The ECHR is an institution created pursuant to the European Convention on
Human Rights and is a constituent part of the Council of Europe, which was
created in 1949 after World War II. See VAN DIJK & VAN HooF, THEORY AND
PRACTICE OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS1-2 (Kluwer Law
& Taxation Publishers, 1998). There are currently 39 European states within the
Council of Europe, subject to the Human Rights Convention and its institutions.
In 1998, Protocol 11 to the Convention revamped its institutional structure to
phase out the European Commission of Human Rights, which previously reviewed all cases prior to their submission to the ECHR. See Protocol 11, Eur.
T.S. No.155, reprinted in 33 I.L.M. 943 (1994). See generally J. Black-Branch,
Observing and Enforcing Human Rights Under the Council of Europe: The Creation of a Permanent European Court of Human Rights, 3 BUFF. J. INT'L L. 1
(1996).
'0'
See supra note 98-100. In 1998, the Organization of African Unity (OAU)

adopted a Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights which,
when ratified by 15 OAU states, will establish an African Court on Human and
Peoples' Rights to complement the work of the pre-existing African Commission
on Human and Peoples' Rights. See generally Nsongurua Udombana, Toward
The African Court On Human And Peoples' Rights: Better Late Than Never,
YALE HUM. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 45 (2000).
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general population. " ' Nor are they selected through any confirmation or approval process that provides opportunities for meaningful public and political review of their qualifications. Other
than the promotion and protection of human rights within their
jurisdictional mandate, they have no political constituency and
are not representative of any particular society."' Finally, at least
with regard to the ECHR and IACHR, the decisions of these
institutions are at least theoretically binding, albeit sometimes
unenforceable. 12 While the practical authority of these institutions may vary, each has a theoretically authoritative role to play
10

The appointment and removal process for judges and experts varies, of course, by
institution. See supra note 104 (regarding selection of treaty-based committees).
The 39 full-time judges on the ECHR, for example, are nominated for renewable
6-year terms by each state party. The nominees must "possess the qualifications
required for appointment to the highest judicial office or be jurisconsults of recognized competence." European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 at arts. 39, 40 (1950) (hereinafter "European Convention"). Traditionally, there is to be one judge from
each state party, elected by the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, in a process that now includes interviews. See Andrew Drzemczewski, The
European Human Rights Convention: A New Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg as of November 1, 1998, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 702-04 (1998). The
Parliamentary Assembly, which consists of representatives from national legislatures, routinely confirms the selection of each state's executive branch. See Sally
Kenney, The Members of the Court of Justice of the European Communities, 5
COLUM. J. EUR. L. 101, 125 n.102 (2000). Judges who serve on the IACHR and
on the Inter-American Commission are selected by the state parties in a process
occasionally marred by "cronyism rather than qualifications" and state politics.
See Jo Pasqualucci, The Inter-American System: Establishing Precedents and Procedures in Human Rights Law, 26 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 297,359 (199495). There is, at this date, no mechanism in place to create public review and
deliberation regarding candidates for the Inter-American positions. It is probably
fair to say that these international decision-makers are publicly accountable in
only the most indirect sense that their continuing appointment may depend upon
the (sometimes) elected executive branches of the member states. The appointment process of these international jurists and experts may be contrasted to the
public deliberation and review that typically accompanies the appointment of
federal judges in the United States. See infra note 157.

..See infra notes 150-169 and accompanying text.
12 The decisions of the ECHR and IACHR are both technically binding. Most
agree that "views" of the HRC regarding individual communications are not (although the HRC believes otherwise). See, Mutua, supra note 3, at 233-35. The
HRC itself has declared that states parties to the Optional Protocol are obligated
to enforce its recommendations on individual petitions. See Steiner, supra note
101, at 30. In this regard, the ECHR is frequently praised as a model for effective
international enforcement of human rights. See generally Helfer & Slaughter,
supra note 3. In contrast to the ECHR decisions, however, actual enforcement of
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and, at minimum, the international system presumes eventual
compliance with their decisions. Ultimately, the international
system hopes to gain sufficient respect for the decisions of such
institutions so that states will eventually choose to comply with
their decision-making (as has been the case for the ECHR).
While many of these characteristics, particularly independence, may reasonably be seen as strengths with regard to the
protection and promotion of human rights,1 3 their international
context potentially creates some arguably troubling implications
for domestic democracy. As explained below, the point of tension here is similar to that which confronts domestic constitutional systems utilizing the judiciary as a check on majoritarian
rule. A group of generally unaccountable decision-makers is entrusted with the resolution of important social debates that have
the potential to displace majoritarian choices regarding highly
contested moral and social issues. There are, of course, many
sound reasons why any particular democratic society might favor
the Inter-American system's judgments has continued to prove problematic. See,
e.g., H. Jarmul, The Effect Of Decisions Of Regional Human Rights Tribunals On
National Tribunals, 28 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 311, 317-18 (1997). But see F.
Cuevas, Honduras Pays Victims' Families, DENVER POST, Nov. 10, 2000 at A45
(reporting that the Honduran Government, after 14 years of intransigence, recently paid $1.6 million dollars to victims' families pursuant to the Inter-American Court's 1986 judgment in the Velazquez disappearances case.) See also
Lawrence Heifer, Overlegalizing Human Rights: International Relations Theory
and the Commonwealth CaribbeanBacklash Against Human Rights Regimes, 102
COLUM. L. REV. 1832, 1870-94 (2002) (regarding the withdrawal from HRC's jurisdiction by three Caribbean nations, etc.). States have similarly tended to ignore
the recommendations of the HRC. See Heifer & Slaughter, supra note 3, at 345
(noting that the HRC's follow up process regarding Optional Protocol decisions,
received state responses on only 81 out of 154 cases finding violations, and that in
only 30% of these 81 cases did the state express a willingness to comply). A lack
of enforcement power tempers democratic legitimacy concerns as states will not
generally find it difficult to resist unpalatable decisions by the HRC and similar
institutions.
"'i

See infra notes 126, 132-33 and accompanying text. It is reasonable to believe
that independence from the political and social passions of the day, to the extent
that is possible, see infra notes 128-29, is important, if not essential, to the effective protection of individual liberties. See, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky, Losing Faith:
America Without Judicial Review? 98 MICH. L. REV. 1416, 1425-32 (2000). United
Nations institutions, focusing on manipulation of courts by government officials,
have also promoted the ideal of judicial independence within member states.
United Nations, Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime
and the Treatment of Offenders, Basic Principles on the Independence of the
Judiciary, U.N. Doc. A/Res/40/146 (Dec. 13, 1985).
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this institutional arrangement.'1 4 Such choices, however, typically
reflect an on-going domestic political debate about the appropriate role for government institutions and the desired balance between individual rights and majoritarian rule. The persistent
debate over judicial review in U.S. constitutional law clearly
manifests this on-going process." 5 Many of the considerations involved in that debate are relevant to the context of international
human rights decision-making. The international context, however, presents important special considerations concerning the
appropriate locus of, and constraints on, decision-making that
may create problematic implications for domestic democracy.
These considerations are identified and discussed further in the
next section."6

4

Good summaries of these benefits may be found in Chemerinsky, supra note 113,

at 1423-35; Lawrence Sager, Thin ConstitutionsAnd The Good Society, 69 FORD.
L. REV. 1989, 1993-98 (2001); Larry Alexander & Fredrick Schauer, Defending
Judicial Supremacy: A Reply, 17 CoNsTrr. COMM. 455, 472, 476-83 (2000); Seth
Kreimer, Exploring the Dark Matter of Judicial Review: A Constitutional Census
of the 1990's, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTs J. 427, 428, 466-72 (1997) (describing the
courts' role in constraining the administrative state and lower level bureaucratic
decision-making); Martin Redish, JudicialDiscipline, JudicialIndependence, And
The Constitution: A Textual And Structural Analysis, 72 S. CAL. L. REV. 673, 67475, 683-90 (1999). The positive role that courts and judicial review may play in the
effective protection of individual rights and minorities has long animated the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme Court. See, e.g., W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943) ("very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them
beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts"); U.S. v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152
n.4 (1938).
11 See infra notes 126, 132-133 and accompanying text. The ongoing dialogue over
judicial review in the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court itself clearly reflects
the centrality of the basic tension between individuals and the majority in a constitutional democracy. See infra notes 128-129. Erwin Chemerinsky, The Supreme
Court, 1988 Term: Foreword: The Vanishing Constitution, 103 HARV. L. REV. 43,
61-73 (1989) (the Supreme Court has "internalized" the "majoritarian paradigm"
regarding judicial review and the role of courts in democracy). Martin Flaherty,
ConstitutionalAsymmetry, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 2073, 2075-78 (2001) (describing
the logic of the counter-majoritarian critique at work in the opinions of Justice
Scalia).
116See infra notes 126, 131-32, 171 and accompanying text.
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THE DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING

A.

DEMOCRACY AND JUDICIAL REVIEW IN AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

The potential for increasingly authoritative judicial decisionmaking in international human rights poses tensions for democratic self-governance analogous to those created by judicial review in constitutional democracies.'17 Perhaps the most
prominent modern exposition of these tensions appears in Alexander Bickel's book, The Least Dangerous Branch."' Bickel es-

sentially argued that judicial review, the power of courts to void
legislative acts as unconstitutional, is inconsistent with representative democracy. Since the power of judicial review allows
unelected, independent and largely unaccountable judges to
overturn majoritarian legislative preferences, Bickel described it
as a "deviant institution in American democracy."" 9 Famously
117There are many good summaries of the debate over judicial review and the major

works that it has produced. See, e.g.,

TERRY PERETrI, IN DEFENSE OF A POLITI-

(Princeton Univ. Press 1999); Frank Cross, Institutions and Enforcement of the Bill of Rights, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1529 (2000); Martin Adler,
Judicial Restraint in the Administrative State: Beyond the Counter Marjoritarian
Difficulty, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 759 (1997). There are, of course, many permutations to democracy based critiques and defenses of judicial review. Whatever the
merits of these perspectives, both the proponents and critics of judicial review
generally acknowledge the critical tension between democracy and authoritative
judicial disapproval of legislative acts. See Rebecca Brown, Accountability, Liberty and the Constitution, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 531 (1998) (critiquing academic
acceptance of Bickel's counter-majoritarian premises and refuting the generally
accepted notion that "political accountability is the sine-qua-non of legitimacy in
government action"). The significance of this tension depends, of course, on a
number of variables including the basic design of government.
CAL COURT

ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH

(Yale Univ. Press 1962).

Bickel's primary arguments, although hardly novel, were timely and have generated a flood of commentary. Some have described this outpouring, which appears
in no danger of abating, as "an obsession" among American constitutional scholars. See Barry Friedman, The History of the Counter MajoritarianDifficulty, Part
One: The Road to Judicial Supremacy, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 333, 335-36 (1998).
Erwin Chemerinsky has even complained that concern over the appropriate role
of the judiciary in democracy has largely defined the Rehnquist Court's jurisprudence. See Chemerinsky, supra note 115.
supra note 118, at 18. Bickel's arguments are premised on the (questionable) primacy of the majoritarian electoral process: "[N]othing can finally depreciate the central function that is assigned in democratic theory and practice to the

19 BICKEL,
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coined as the "counter-majoritarian difficulty," this alleged usurpation of majoritarian democracy is most problematic in constitutional cases where the textual authority is highly indeterminate
and thus subject to manipulation and the influence of personal
biases. 2 ' Critics of judicial review have also argued that it tends
to undermine the vitality of deliberative democracy and devalue
the legislative function.12" '
The main thrust of these arguments is that providing an unaccountable judiciary the power to overturn majoritarian legislative preferences undermines democratic self-governance by

electoral process; nor can it be denied that the policy-making power of representative institutions, born of the electoral process, is the distinguishing characteristic of the system. Judicial review works counter to this characteristic." Id. at 19.
Many commentators have questioned this seemingly facile equation of the political branches with representation of "the people" of the United States. See, e.g.,
Akhil Reed Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited: ConstitutionalAmendment Outside Article
V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043, 1085-87 (1988).
120See, e.g., Lino Gralia, Revitalizing the Constitution, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y

2

165, 176-77 (2000) ("The Court has made the Fourteenth Amendment an empty
vessel into which it can pour any meaning, converting it into a grant of unlimited
policymaking power.") JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 14
(Harvard Univ. Press 1980) (noting that many constitutional provisions are "difficult to read responsibly as anything other than quite broad invitations to import
into the constitutional decision process considerations that will not be found in
the language of the amendment or the debates that led up to it.") See Erwin
Chemerinsky, Wrong Questions Get Wrong Answers: An Analysis of Professor
Carter's Approach to Judicial Review, 66 B.U. L. REV. 47, 47-48, 69-70 (1986);
Cross, supra note 117, at 1540-1550. See generally PERETri, supra note 117, at 3842, 50-53 (summarizing the various strains of the indeterminacy critic of judicial
review).
See Cass Sunstein, The Supreme Court 1995 Term: Foreword: Leaving Things Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 6,7-9, 19-20. 33-37 (1996) (arguing for a "minimalist"
approach to constitutional interpretation that enhances political deliberation and
democratic decision-making). See generally Mark Tushnet, Policy Distortion and
Democratic Deliberation: Comparative Illumination of the Counter Majoritarian
Difficulty, 94 MICH. L. REV. 245, 250-56, 266-70 (1995). See also Paul D. Carrington, Restoring Vitality to State and Local Politics by Correcting the Excessive
Independence of the Supreme Court, 50 ALA. L. REV. 397 (1999). In perhaps the
earliest academic exposition on the counter majoritarian difficulty, James Thayer
espoused essentially this rationale for limiting judicial review to cases involving
"very clear" constitutional error "not open to rational question." See James
Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of ConstitutionalLaw, 7
HARV. L. REV. 129, 144 (1893). See also Robin West, The Aspirational Constitution, 88 Nw. U. L. REV. 241 (1993) (part of a symposium on Thayer); Tushnet,
Policy Distortion,supra at 245-50.
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displacing majoritarian rule by that of the judiciary.122 These critiques are essentially reliant on the following factual premises:
(1) unelected or otherwise unaccountable judges as authoritative
decision-makers; (2) the power to void or overturn legislative or
executive actions; (3) binding judicial authority and legal
supremacy rendering judicial decisions difficult or impossible to
reverse; and (4) indeterminate, malleable textual authority that
provides room for the imposition of personal judicial values.
The primary point for most critics of judicial review is that
judicial decision-making should be limited in ways consistent
with democratic self-governance."2 John Hart Ely, for example,
has famously argued for a "representation-reinforcing" theory
that would limit judicial review to decisions necessary to "correct" deficiencies in the democratic processes.1 14 Politically conservative theoreticians, such as Robert Bork, have argued for
significant interpretive limitations on judicial authority, advocating doctrines such as strict textualism and "originalism," supposedly designed to reduce the influence of personal biases."2
A great many American scholars have attempted to reconcile judicial review with American democracy. Many have argued that judicial review is entirely consistent with the antimajoritarian elements embedded in our Constitution. 6 Other
122See supra notes 117-120; infra notes 124-25. See also Cross, supra note 117, at

122

1529-33 (reviewing common arguments).
See CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:

124

(Aspen Press 2d ed. 2001); PERETI, supra note 117, at 11-20, 24-36, 59-63, 72-77
(summarizing major approaches focused on this theme).
ELY, supra note 120, at 87-88, 101-03. Even commentators more generally sup-

PRINCIPLES

AND

POLICIES,

17-23

portive of judicial review have responded to the debate by arguing for limitations
on the judicial role which are designed to ameliorate its potential negative effects
on majoritarian democracy. See generally PERETTI, supra note, 117 at 11-77
(summarizing the major works). See also Brown, supra note 117, at 531-38.
12 See, e.g., Robert Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some First Amendment
Problems,
47 IND. L. J. 1, 3-6, 17 (1971); Lino A. Graglia, Constitutional Interpretation,44
SYRACUSE. L. REV. 631, 631-36 (1993) (defending an originalist, textualist interpretation of the Constitution); Raoul Berger, Against an Activist Court, 31 CATH.
U. L. REV. 173 (1982). See also PEREII, supra note 117, at 17, 27-29 (providing a
concise summary).
126 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 120, at 48, 65-67; Redish, supra note 114, at
674-75, 683-700; PEREIII, supra note 117, at 26, 36, 55-61. See also RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY,

132-49, 198-99 (Harvard Univ. Press

1977) ("The Constitution, and particularly the Bill of Rights, is designed to protect individual citizens and groups against certain decisions that a majority of
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analysts have described process or structural limits on the implications of judicial review based on the nature of the judicial decision-making. According to some, the threat of "law-making" by
judges is significantly restrained by judicial temperament and
training, institutional checks, and the role of logic and precedent.'27 Similarly, socialization and cultural connection limits the
potential that judges will stray from majoritarian preferences. 2 '
American judges are, after all, products of American social, legal
and political culture and almost inevitably share mainstream sensibilities.'29 Others have stressed that structural checks on judicial power such as impeachment, the appointment process,
citizens might want to make, even when that majority acts in what it takes to be
the general or common interest." Id. at 133).
127See also PEREYri, supra note 117, at 12, 15; Cross, supra note 117, at 1537-38

(reviewing arguments about the special qualities of judges and describing some of
their shortcomings).
'2'Some scholars have similarly questioned whether the premises of the "countermajoritarian dilemma" are empirically justified, pointing out that judges rarely
rule counter to prevailing majoritarian political and social values. See, e.g., Reed,
supra note 119, at 1085-87; Cross, supra note 117, at 1536-45, 1554-76 (critiquing
the empirical assumptions of the CMD debate and citing studies); Chemerinsky,
supra note 115, at 82; Graber, supra note 80, at 381-82 (citing his own study);
PERETFI, supra note 117, at 55-56, 84-112. See also MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS, supra note 80, at 153 (".... we see the
courts regularly being more or less in line with what the dominant national political coalition wants.... It offers essentially random changes, sometimes good and
sometimes bad, to what the political system produces.") But see Chemerinsky,
Losing Faith, supra note 113, at 1416-17, 1422-31 (noting the trend in constitutional scholarship to discount the positive effects of judicial review and castigating Tushnet for the "systematic minimization of the benefits of judicial review
and exaggeration of its costs").
129See,

e.g., Michael Klarman, What's So Great About Constitutionalism?,93 Nw. U.
L. REV. 145, 146, 188-92 (1998) (arguing that federal judges are from the American "cultural elite" and rarely stray from popular opinion being subject to "internal" cultural restraints and the same "cultural milieu" that produces the
legislation that they review). One could similarly argue that judges tend to be
socially and politically conservative elite who have generally used judicial review
to reinforce embedded and unjust social relations. See Ran Hirschl, The Struggle
for Hegemony: UnderstandingJudicialEmpowerment Through Constitutionalization in Culturally Divided Polities, 36 STAN. J. INT'L L. 73, 75 (2000). See also
West, supra note 121, at 247-48. Recognizing these features of the American judicial process, several prominent progressive constitutional scholars have joined
traditionally conservative calls for curtailment of judicial review. See, e.g.,
TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION, supra note 80; West, supra note 121. Development of this trend is somewhat ironic in that judicial review, prompted in
many cases by the American experience, has begun to gain prominence throughout the world. See infra note 154.

Vol 21, No. I

Democratic Legitimacy in Human Rights

43

congressional control over federal jurisdiction, and the potential
for democratic revision, reduce the negative implications of judicial review for American democracy. 3 °
Although the variations are many, arguments defending the
democratic legitimacy of judicial review focus on three related
themes. First, liberal constitutional democracy does not simply
consist of blind adherence to majority rule. Rather, authentic democracy may and often does include effective constraints on
majoritarian preferences in favor of minorities and individual liberties. 3 ' This is undoubtedly of particular importance in heterogeneous, pluralistic, and multi-cultural societies and to
international human rights. Second, there are important functional justifications for judicial review, including the alleged neutrality and independence of judges from the political process. 3 2
Who, other than judges, are in a position to check the excesses of
democratic rule? Judicial review, in this sense, preserves the integrity of the constitution and provides a necessary check on
other branches of government.'3 3 Third, the power of judicial
"o See generally PERE-r'I, supra note 117, at 133-37, 150; Michael Perry, The Authority of the Text, Tradition, and Reason: A Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation,
58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551 (1985). One of the most troubling implications of judicial
review for some critics is its potential for rendering the legislature powerless in
constitutional cases. See, e.g., BICKEL, supra note 118, at 20; Planned Parenthood
v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 989 (1992) (Scalia, dissenting).
131 See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Wrong Questions, supra note 120, at 48-50, 65-68 (the
American Constitution is intentionally anti-majoritarian, and judicial review
strengthens commitment to preserve certain values over majoritarian will). See
also supra notes 114 and 126. Citing a study by Robert Dahl, Steven Crowley has
noted that modern transitions to democratic rule have inevitably included some
mechanisms for constraining majority rule. See Crowley, supra note 74, at 704. It
is equally true that the international human rights system is largely premised on
the Western liberal ideal that rights act primarily as limitations on governmental
action (and, in democracies, majority rule) in favor of individuals. See supra
notes 84 and 95.
132See, e.g., Chemerinsky, Wrong Questions, supra note 120, at 69; Cross, supra note
117, at 1537-62, 1576 (reviewing and critiquing the common reasons given for
favoring judicial review including the idea that the court is the institution best
suited to provide a check on the potential excesses of majority rule).
133This was, in essence, one of Justice John Marshall's primary rationales in Marbury when he suggested that the Constitution, in the absence of judicial review,
would reduce "to nothing what we have deemed the greatest improvement on
political institutions- a written constitution". See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177-178 (1803). Some commentators have suggested that judicial
review should also be favored for the related benefits of authoritative settlement
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review may in fact enhance democracy by providing moral leadership,134 protecting the democratic process and ensuring adequate opportunities for political participation by all members of
the polity. 3 ' One might even suggest that "value voting" by
judges, in accordance with the political orientation of those who
placed them in office, is an inevitable and positive feature of
democratic governance.136
In essence, the primary defense of judicial review in the
American constitutional context has been that it serves an important check on majoritarian rule that is both historically and functionally part of the American system of democracy. As described
below, however, this particular defense reflects a distinctly
American view of democracy and human rights that is not necessarily shared by other cultures. In any case, the fundamental
choices involved reflect political judgments and an on-going balance of interests that arguably may be best left to domestic democratic processes. In other words, the role of authoritative
judicial decision-making in democracy is itself a highly contested
issue at the center of democratic choice that may not be suitable
for a definitive and uniform international resolution.

'34

of highly contested social and political issues. See Lawrence Alexander & Fredrick Schauer, Extrajudicial Constitutional Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV.
1359, 1361-62, 1371-80 (1997).
See PERETH, supra note 117, at 22, 57-58, 68 (describing some of these positions);

Graber, supra note 80, at 403 (judicial review's capacity to enhance public debate
over issues).
135 This is essentially the gatekeeper or "representation - reinforcing" function es-

1

poused by Ely. ELY, supra note 120. Ely's arguments concerning preserving political participation and democratic process are primarily designed to describe the
appropriate limits of judicial review. Other critics of judicial review have similarly argued that it tends to undermine the vitality and effectiveness of our deliberative processes as legislators worry less about constitutional considerations,
presuming that their excesses will be corrected by the courts. See ELY, supra note
120.
Terry Peretti, for example, accepts complaints about the role of political bias in
the court's decision-making but provides reasons why "value-voting" should be
seen as an asset in American democracy. Peretti argues that "value-voting" by
judges exercising judicial review actually enhances democracy since the appointment process is itself a political process reflecting majoritarian orientation and
outcomes. See PERETTI, supra note 117, at 5, 78-102, 133-35, 152. Since judges
tend to decide cases consistently with the viewpoint of their original political
sponsors, judicial review is simply another manifestation of the democratic political process. Id.
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IMPLICATIONS OF THE COUNTER-MAJORITARIAN
DEBATE FOR INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL
DECISION-MAKING

What are the potential implications of the debate over judicial review for international human rights decision-making? Initially, it is important to recognize that there are both significant
similarities and differences between international judicial and
quasi-judicial decision-making and the power of judicial review
exercised by domestic constitutional courts.
Some of the factors that render judicial review controversial
in the domestic context 37 are only partially evident in the international human rights system. While international judicial and
quasi-judicial proceedings have increased in their scope, frequency and authority, the existing human rights system is premised on the primacy of national implementation and
authority. 3 In most domestic legal systems, neither inchoate
human rights treaty obligations nor subsequent international interpretations of rights are given "direct effect." '39 Thus, although
137See supra notes 117-25 and accompanying text.
138See supra note 94, infra notes 139-146 and accompanying text. Ubiquitous ex-

haustion of remedy requirements is one manifestation of such primacy.
139Most states have traditionally followed, in effect, what is often described as the

"dualist" approach to international law by denying international legal obligations
any "direct effect" within the domestic legal system absent some positive act of

incorporation. See, e.g.,

MARK JANis, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL

85-86, 97-102 (3d ed. 1999). See also Thomas Buergenthal, Modern Constitutions and Human Rights Treaties, 36 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 211, 215-20
(1997) (describing trends away from the dualist approach). The United States
generally follows a hybrid approach allowing that some treaties may be given
direct effect through the judicial doctrine of "self-execution." See JANIS, supra at
86-96. The United States Senate has uniformly designated human rights treaties
as "non self-executing" in the ratification process. See, e.g., Buergenthal, supra at
229-22. In contrast, many members of the European Convention on Human
Rights have agreed to the direct incorporation of its obligations, including recently, the United Kingdom. See, e.g., Slaughter & Helfer, supra note 3, at 295;
(U.K.) Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42, reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 464 (1999). Ironically, customary international human rights law is treated more generously than
treaties by U.S. courts. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980). In part because customary rules lack the potential democratic check of
incorporation, there is continuing controversy over the appropriateness of their
domestic legal status. See, e.g., Trimble, supra note 58, at 718-23. See also Patrick
Kelly, The Twilight Of Customary International Law, 40 VA. J. INT'L L. 449
(2000).
LAW
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there is some evidence of a trend to the contrary, 4 ° international
treaty obligations are often not deemed authoritative domestically until "incorporated" into the domestic legal system,
typically by the legislature. A requirement of domestic incorporation arguably provides a potentially important "democratic filter" through which international rules must pass before
becoming binding domestic law, thereby significantly improving
the democratic authenticity of international human rights treaty
obligations."'
In addition, while some prominent human rights institutions
have at least technically binding judicial authority that might supplant domestic interpretations of rights, this power is not widespread among international institutions and is not reinforced by
effective enforcement powers.'42 Outside of the arguably sui
generis context of Europe,143 major human rights institutions such
as the IACHR and the HRC have encountered significant
problems engendering state compliance.1" Since the decisions of
See Buergenthal, supra note 139, at 215-20. Judge Buergenthal observes that
Western and Latin American democracies have increasingly given international
human rights treaty obligations authoritative domestic legal status, sometimes superior to ordinary legislation. Id.
141 See Catherine Powell, Dialogic Federalism:
Constitutional PossibilitiesFor Incorporation Of Human Rights Law In The United States, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 245,
260-68 (2001) (discussing a democratic deficit resulting from federal adoption of
human rights treaties without active participation from the public or state and
local governments).
'42 See supra notes 104-05, 112 and accompanying text. The Inter-American Court's
judgments are technically enforceable in the domestic courts of member states.
See American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 61, 63, 68, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123. Judgments of the ECHR are directly enforceable in the domestic
courts if so provided by the member state's domestic law. European Convention,
supra note 110, at art. 213. See Slaughter & Heifer. supra note 3, at 295.
13 See supra note 37. The work of the European human rights institutions, particu'0o

larly the ECHR, has clearly attained authoritative status among member states
resulting in frequent revision of national law in response to the system's output.
See generally Slaughter & Heifer, supra note 3; Andrew Drzemczewski, Principle
Characteristicsof the New ECHR Control Mechanism, As Establishedby Protocol
11, 15 HuM. RTs. L.J. 81, 82-83 (1994).
'44

See supra note 104-05, 112 and accompanying text. In this sense, democratic approval of the treaty text merely begs the more important question regarding what
specifically the state has actually agreed to do. In most human rights treaties, for
example, the primary promise is to "implement" or "recognize" rights through
national implementation including legislation if necessary. See, e.g., ICCPR,
supra note 23, at art. 2. Does this obligation also imply an obligation to implement such rights precisely according to international definitions or applications
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international human rights institutions have, at best, ambiguous
legal status and are not generally enforceable directly within
most domestic legal regimes, compliance typically depends upon
the will of executive or legislative authorities. Recalcitrant governments have not found it difficult, outside of Europe, to ignore
disfavored international juridical decisions.145
Thus, international human rights judicial and quasi-judicial
decision-making either does not enjoy, or has not effectively
demonstrated, binding supremacy over national legislative preferences. 46 In the absence of binding authority, the implications
that are subsequently developed by the HRC? See supra notes 94 and 105, (Gen.
Com. 24). Or does initial state consent to the treaty merely signify an agreement
by the state to pursue such general inchoate obligations in a manner consistent
with the sensibilities of its people, reserving a margin of discretion in specific
applications? See Donoho, Autonomy, supra note 3, at 420-28. The former view
obviously has significant implications for democratic self-governance, while the
latter may be seen as undermining the effectiveness of human rights. Id. While
there is no clear consensus about the appropriate functions of the international
human rights system, it seems apparent that "internationalizing" rights serves the
general purpose of seeking progressive improvement in the human condition by
modifying how governments treat their own citizens. Although the specific
meaning of rights may vary by context and place, the international system
presumes the existence of certain transcendent, universal values, that all individuals are entitled to solely by virtue of their status as human beings. Facilitating the
achievement of these values through international mechanisms, such as those described here, is undoubtedly a primary justification for the internationalization of
rights. See, e.g., Catherine Powell, Introduction: Locating Culture, Identity and
Human Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 201, 202-03 (1999); Donoho, Relativism, supra note 94, at 356-60; Rhoda Howard, Dignity, Community, and
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES: A QUEST
FOR CONSENSUS 81 (A. An-Na'im ed., 1992). See also Oscar Schachter, Human
Dignity as a Normative Concept, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 848 (1983).
145See supra notes 104-05, 112.
"6

The relationship between domestic and international decision-makers over the
interpretation or application of rights is critical but uncertain. Whether given direct effect or legislatively incorporated, one might reasonably argue that domestic institutions should have a significant role, if not supremacy, in determining the
meaning of international rights once incorporated into domestic law. Some commentators have emphasized the positive potential for human rights from domestic interpretive contributions. See, e.g., Karen Knop, Here and There:
International Law in Domestic Courts, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L.& POL. 501, 504-06,
516-17, 526-33 (2000) (describing a system without significant domestic interpretive authority as "fraught with the anxiety of imperialism" and advocating the
"translation" versus "transmittal" of binding international norms). See also Harold Koh, The 1998 Frankel Lecture: Bringing InternationalLaw Home, 35 Hous.
L. REV. 623, 642-43 (1998) (discussing the "domestication" of international
norms and the process by which states may "internalize" such rules). The question, however, remains fraught with ambiguity and will depend on, among other
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for democracy of international decision-making in human rights
are far less pronounced. Although government officials might
conceivably "hide" behind an international decision,'47 fears of
democratic displacement by unaccountable international actors
are, practically speaking, insignificant. Actual enforcement depends upon action by accountable domestic actors who are presumably responsive to democratic political and electoral
processes. In this fashion, the practical necessity of national enforcement arguably provides another critical domestic filter,
which may serve to preserve democratic prerogatives.
The existing deficit in international judicial authority in
human rights does not, of course, render the democratic legitimacy of such decision-making irrelevant. There is a discernable
trend internationally to utilize adjudicative solutions to international problems, including human rights."4 Even when not binding or effectively enforceable, the decisions of international
institutions may have important legal, economic or political consequences for the society concerned. When an international institution has adjudged a nation to have violated its international
obligations, other nations may act accordingly. Moreover, a primary goal of international judicial and quasi-judicial human
things, the future evolution of international institutional authority and potential
constitutional limitations. See, e.g., Mark Weisburd, International Courts and
American Courts, 21 MICH. J. INT'L L. 877, 892-900 (2000) (arguing that U.S.
courts are not bound by ICJ judgments, and that an agreement to be bound
would violate Article III). See also Brian Havel, The Constitution In An Era Of
SupranationalAdjudication, 78 N.C. L. REV. 257, 282-90 (2000).
147Similar kinds of complaints were raised against the Australian government's perfectly reasonable decision to accept the judgment of the HRC that criminalization of consensual sodomy by Tasmania violated the ICCPR. Toonen v.
Australia, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm.. No. 488, U.N. Doc. CCPR/c/50[D/488/1992
(1994). The Australian popular press castigated the Australian federal government primarily for "abdicating" sovereignty to an unaccountable international
body rather than for its support of the HRC's substantive position. See INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT

739-41 (H. Steiner & P. Alston, eds., 1996)

(providing excerpts).
148See generally Petersmann, supra note 4; Benedict Kingsbury, Foreword: Is The
Proliferation Of International Courts And Tribunals A Systemic Problem?, 31
N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 679 (1999); John Barton & Barry Carter, International
Law And Institutions For A New Age, 81 GEO. L.J. 535, 561 (1993); Bolton, supra
note 2, at 212-16 (complaining of "efforts by human rights groups to judicialize,
on an international basis, various issues, thus removing them from the purview of
national politics").
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rights institutions must ultimately be to engender sufficient credibility, respect and legitimacy that their decisions are respected
and voluntarily enforced.
Most importantly, tracing the implications of such decisionmaking for democratic self-governance may provide important
insights regarding the future development of the international
human rights institutions and their authority. Should the international community follow the European model and accept the judicial and quasi-judicial decisions of the IACHR, the HRC and
other international human rights institutions as binding or directly enforceable within their respective domestic systems? The
answer to this basic question depends, to a significant degree, on
the democratic characteristics of such institutions and the implications of such authority for domestic democratic processes. It is
critical, in this regard, that international judicial and quasi-judicial processes evolve in ways that will enhance democratic selfgovernance and autonomy.149
Many of the allegedly "anti-democratic" characteristics of
judicial review that have caused domestic controversy appear
equally applicable to international human rights decision-making. Indeed, the central fear that unaccountable decision-makers
will interpret indeterminate rules in accordance with personal biases and without democratic deliberation or revision is clearly
multiplied by the international context. Decision-makers on international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies are clearly not accountable, in any meaningful sense, to the people whose lives
their decisions concern.15 ° For better or worse, the judges and
experts who serve on major international human rights institutions will inevitably be highly educated, often Western oriented,
elite."' Being selected from a wide range of countries, international human rights experts and judges are, by definition, predominately persons from societies other than the disputing
See supra notes 67-87 and accompanying text, infra notes 183-191 and accompanying text.
150See supra notes 101-03, 110 and accompanying text; infra notes 151-169 and ac141

151

companying text.
Human rights treaties generally provide that only persons of prominence, education and experience should be appointed to serve. See supra notes 101 and 110.
This hardly seems surprising and may make tremendous sense. Experience and
proven competency are clearly important criteria when selecting decision-makers.
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parties.'52 Whatever their other merits, these decision-makers are
truly faceless for the vast majority of the world's population and
from the various domestic societies their
culturally disconnected
53
concern.
decisions
Such conditions of independence are probably by design and
have important merits. Constitutional democracies frequently
choose to create strong, independent judiciaries, at least in part
to protect individual liberties and isolate judges from short-term
political passions.54 Access to independent decision-makers may
be critical to effective international protection of human rights
which, after all, are essentially designed to provide limitations on
how governments may treat their own citizens.
Yet, the degree of isolation and independence of international judicial decision-makers from democratic political
It also explains, however, why international decision-makers in human rights institutions will inevitably tend to be persons from the highly educated, elite classes. The same accusation may, of course, be leveled at members of domestic
judiciaries. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 129, at 146, 188-92 (describing culturally elite biases of federal judges); supra note 129. Judicial tribunals are not, by
nature, populist institutions historically.
112 Most international human rights institutions require, either by rule or practice,
that the experts who serve on them come from different countries. See (last visited Jan. 14, 2003). The ECHR's practice is that there be one judge from each
member of the Convention, although cases are now generally heard by 7 judge
chambers. See Drzemczewski, supra note 143.
153The web site for the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights provides an in-

formational chart for everyone who serves on the major treaty-based bodies.
One may argue, of course, that culture is irrelevant to the meaning of human
rights standards. See Donoho, Autonomy, supra note 3, at 404, 408-09, 417.
Whatever the merits of this debate, it seems indisputable that such "connectedness" has relevance to the democratic legitimacy of decision-making generally.
Indeed, the grounding of jurists in social context provides an important justification for authoritative judicial decision-making within democracy. Id.
"4

There is an increased reliance on judicial review worldwide. See Gustavo Fernandes de Andrade, Comparative Constitutional Law: Judicial Review, 3 U. PA. J.
CONST. L. 977, 977-78 (2001); Bojan Bugaric, Courts As Policy-Makers: Lessons
From Transition, 42 HARV. INT'L L.J. 247, 249-55, 260-62, 277-79 (2001). The
justifications for judicial independence are usually broader than improving the
courts= effectiveness as a check on majoritarian preferences and protection for
individual rights. Judicial independence may be seen as part of an overall system
of checks and balances in the distribution of governmental power. Indeed, this
was one of the primary rationales for judicial review articulated by Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison. Thus, judicial review is arguably an important component of the American commitment to constitutionalism, federalism, checks and
balances and limits on the authority of central government generally.
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processes is pronounced and has unique characteristics. First, international decision-makers and the rules they apply will be perceived as, and essentially are, extrinsic to the domestic polity. If
for no other reason, international legal outcomes will, therefore,
be perceived as external to the domestic democratic process.155
The perception that such "extrinsic" authority lacks democratic
legitimacy is exacerbated by the international decision-makers'
lack of social and cultural connection to any particular domestic
polity. Whatever else its merits, the extrinsic nature of international decision-making will inevitably produce concerns over
democratic legitimacy, particularly as its authority grows.
Second, the problem of "extrinsic-ness" is worsened by the
largely secretive and inaccessible processes by which international judges and experts are selected. Currently, such appointments are essentially still a function of international relations,
left exclusively to executive branch discretion, largely untouched
by democratic deliberative processes."' The lack of transparency
and democratic responsiveness of international selection
processes might be contrasted to the appointment of U.S. federal
judges whose confirmation proceedings are widely publicized,
often contested and include the opportunity for elected representatives to review and reject candidates. 57
Third, confirmation and other mechanisms for introducing
democratic accountability to judicial decision-making, such as
impeachment, recall or periodic election, may be impractical and
ineffective in the international context. 58 Implementation of
such checks on judicial power would not only be cumbersome

155

See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, Dualistic Values in the Age of International Legis-

prudence, 44 HASTINGS. L.J. 185 (1993); Stephan, supra note 4, at 238-42, 245,
253-56.
156 See supra notes 104-05, 110.
157

See generally PERE-r-ri, supra note 117, at 82-85, 100-104, 112, 133-134 (discussing

how the appointment process itself may reinforce democratic values). The highly
politicized appointment process in the United States may also be contrasted to
the European approach which is based on a civil service model focusing on professional judicial experience and training. Id. at 85. It may also be contrasted to
the system of electing of judges preferred by many U.S. states.
158See infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text; supra note 130.
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but also highly impractical for global institutions with wide membership.159 Practically speaking, opportunities and motivations
for exercising such mechanisms would necessarily be diffuse internationally. For obvious reasons, international judges and experts serving on global institutions come from many different
countries. Their decisions may affect different societies with divergent social, religious and cultural orientations quite differently. Rarely would there be a sufficient coalescing of interests
among diverse democratic populations to exercise effective control over the selection of international judges and experts, or
their decisions."
The diffusion of interests over specific
substantive issues might have the same practical disabling effect.16 ' Thus, even if mechanisms for improving the democratic
159The

6

practical problems in implementing effective checks may be an inherent
problem for global international human rights institutions. For example, even if
domestic review mechanisms for the selection of international judges were created, they would be irrelevant for most countries. There are necessarily a limited
number of positions available on international human rights institutions, some of
which will be reserved, as a practical matter, for large, powerful countries. Thus,
outside of regional institutions with limited state membership, most countries
have little potential that a candidate from their society will serve on such bodies.
Although international experts and judges clearly do not "represent" their countries of origin, the cultural, social and political connection of judges provides an
important explanation of why judicial review may be consistent with democratic
self-governance. See supra notes 128-29, 144-46 and accompanying text. Adoption
of accountability mechanisms may, however, simply beg the question of whether
a shared community or demos exists that might effectively deploy them. In a
sense, the capacity of mechanisms such as confirmation, recall, or periodic election to enhance the democratic legitimacy of judicial review depends upon the
existence of a shared community or demos that is entitled to exercise them. While
one may reasonably believe that such a shared community is evolving in Europe
under the European Convention and the EU, its existence globally, or even regionally, is currently doubtful. See supra notes 8, 25-6, 44, 55.
Assume, for example, that a fundamentalist Muslim legal expert, who holds views

on the rights of women that are anathema to most Westerners, is proposed by the
Iranian government for membership on the HRC. (One could just as easily imagine a Roman Catholic candidate morally opposed to abortion and same-sex marriage, or someone like Robert Bork, being promoted as a candidate.) It is not at
all certain that sufficient international consensus against such candidates could be
raised by interested governments (or people, were more direct approval mechanisms adopted). The potential disabling effect of such diffusions of interests may,
of course, also occur regarding not only judicial philosophy or orientation but
also any particular substantive issue.
16' For example, while most Americans favor the death penalty and the right of a
woman to choose an abortion, contrary regional sensibilities on those controversial issues means that it would be improbable that Americans could organize an
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accountability of international decision-makers were created, the
practical capacity of people to effectively exercise such control
would be limited at best. This practical reality is similar to the
dilution of democratic voting power that accompanies the expansion of democratic governmental authority from, for example, a
state to federal level or from a national to supranational institution like the EU. As described above, the potential diminution
or dilution of democratic voice that may accompany the transfer
of authority to ever-larger political communities is a central complaint of those who criticize the democratic legitimacy of international governance generally.162
Finally, many of the moderating social factors and legal doctrines that help legitimize independent judicial review in constitutional democracies may have limited applicability
internationally. For example, many commentators have argued
that the debate over judicial review in U.S. constitutional law is
misleading since empirical evidence suggests that judges naturally tend to reflect, and ultimately ratify, the dominant moral
and political views of American society.'6 3 Studies demonstrating
that Supreme Court Justices have overwhelmingly voted with the
general political orientation of the administration that promoted
them to the bench, provide evidence that domestic democratic
preferences limit and shape judicial output."6 Even if their jobs
are protected from the short-term whims and passions of the political process, federal judges remain vested participants in
American society. Their decision-making is necessarily seeped in
American political and cultural traditions. Similarly, American
judges find themselves constrained, some would argue, by legal
doctrines training and temperament that demand suppression of
effective international countermand to an authoritative decision by the IACHR
declaring capital punishment or abortion illegal.
62 See supra notes 16, 29-36, 49-56 and accompanying text.
163See supra notes 128-29.

See generally PERETrI, supra note 117, at 84-104, 112

(summarizing this frequently made argument); Cross, supra note 117, at 1554-57.
See also Klarman, supra note 129, at 191-92.
'64

See PERETTI, supra note 117, at 112; Cross, supra note 117, at 1544-45. Anyone
doubting this proposition need only review the court's recent opinion in Bush v.
Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), an opinion routinely castigated for the apparent influence of political preferences on its outcome and reasoning. See generally Michael
Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens of Constitutional History, 89 CAL. L.
REV. 1721, 1724-47 (2001); John Yoo, Bush v. Gore: In Defense of the Court's
Legitimacy, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 775 (2001).
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personal biases, recognition of institutional limitations and deference to democratic processes.'65 In essence, the cultural, social,
political and philosophical "connected-ness" of judges tempers
the anti-democratic implications of their independent authority.
Whether such ameliorating factors constrain the anti-democratic implications of international judicial decision-making is
doubtful at best. Decision-makers on international human rights
institutions necessarily come from a wide variety of backgrounds,
cultures and political settings. While some significant commonalties in background and orientation may exist among international
decision-makers," 6 their differences will be pronounced. International human rights decision-makers can not, as a group, be
seeped in the cultural, social, political or judicial traditions of any
one particular democratic society. As a group, such decisionmakers lack the "connected-ness" to democratic societies that
some argue tempers the anti-democratic implications of judicial
independence.
Practically speaking, it is impossible for such decision-makers to be responsive to the various divergent traditions of the diverse domestic polities under their jurisdiction.'6 7 Each
international judge or expert arguably has only his own political,
cultural and social biases upon which to base his decision-making
over rights that are generally indeterminate and open to divergent interpretations.168 Whatever the merits of the on-going debate over the universality of rights,'69 global diversity and the
'6

See, e.g., PERErI, supra note 117, at 135-37. See also Cross, supra note 117, at

1537-38.
166See supra notes 101 and 151 and accompanying text.

167In one sense this begs the obvious question of whether international decisionmakers should be responsive to the world's diversity. See generally Donoho, Autonomy, supra note 3; infra notes 185-87 and accompanying text. Although related to the debate over universal rights, the question here concerns the degree to
which an international decision-maker should account for such diverse traditions
out of respect for democratic voice.
168See infra notes 178-85 and accompanying text; supra notes 91-93. There are, of
course, potential benefits from this diversity of backgrounds. If human rights are
based upon universal values, the diverse viewpoints brought to the international
judicial table could greatly contribute to the evolution of standards with universal
acceptability.
169See Donoho, Autonomy, supra note 3. See also supra notes 62-63, 84, 94, 144.
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unavoidable disconnect between international judges and domestic polities will tend to undermine the perceived democratic legit-

imacy of international human rights decision-making.
There is another, perhaps more important, facet to this "disconnect" problem. Since few rights are absolute, their practical
application inevitably involves striking some balance between
the needs and wants of individual rights holders and the public
interest.17 ° In constitutional democracies, this balance is reflected

in the classic tension between majority rule and constitutional
limitations which favor individuals and minority groups. 1 ' Different societies naturally approach these issues in different ways,
reaching varying specific outcomes that reflect deep political and
social choices regarding the relationship of individuals to society
and the appropriate role of government institutions. The manner
in which this balance is struck is often largely determinative of
particular outcomes in human rights cases.
Although the international human rights system clearly reflects a Western orientation,'7 2 there appears to be no current international consensus about the appropriate balance between
majoritarian preferences, perceived public interest and the needs
and desires of minorities and individuals.'73 Nor does a consensus
exist regarding which institutions should be entrusted with this

170

See Donoho, Autonomy, supra note 3, at 444-50.

A significant part of the U.S. Supreme Court's rights jurisprudence is designed to
accommodate this inevitable balancing of interests in ways consistent with the
perceived political structure of American constitutional democracy. See id.; supra
note 118. The jurisprudence of the ECHR similarly reflects such tensions but
also attempts to accommodate special considerations involving its status as an
international institution and national domestic prerogatives. Donoho, Autonomy,
supra note 3, at 455-56, 460-62.
172See supra notes 84 and 131.
173The primary thrust of most literature discussing diverse, non-Western, orienta-

tions towards human rights essentially involves these basic values regarding individualism versus community. See supra notes 77 and 84. Arguably, international
decision-makers are ill-equipped to evaluate the interests of the defendant's democratic majority to which they are foreign and unfamiliar. This rationale is the
driving force behind the ECHR's practice of allowing member states a "margin of
appreciation" in their implementation of rights. See generally H. YOURow, THE
MARGIN OF APPRECIATION DOCTRINE IN THE DYNAMICS OF EUROPEAN HUMAN
RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE

95, 731-35.

(1996);

VAN DIJK

&

VAN HOOF,

supra note 109, at 82-
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complex, evolving and fundamentally political act of balancing. 74
Given the profound diversity that characterizes the world community, the lack of consensus over such issues should hardly be
surprising. Indeed, there is no real consensus about this balance
even within the highly developed rights jurisprudence of the U.S.
Supreme Court. Even a casual observer of the court would readily recognize that its members hold widely divergent views regarding the appropriate balance between majoritarian interests
and individuals', and the court's role in determining that
balance.'7 5
These differing views are not merely abstractions. Rather, a
judge's perspective regarding the tension between individual and
community interests inevitably has a direct impact on the concrete outcome of rights disputes. The particular balance struck,
itself a politically contested issue, is typically determinative of the
concrete meaning of individual rights in practice. Thus, whether
the right of privacy includes the right to assisted suicide may depend upon, among other factors, a particular society's traditional
priorities regarding competing public and individual interests.'76
It also depends upon which institutions and processes are entrusted with this balancing of interests. Among the world's diverse democracies, this institutional question may be answered in
different ways depending upon, among other things, the stress
given to majoritarianism and legislative supremacy.
All of this raises important, potentially troubling, questions
regarding the development of authoritative international judicial
solutions to highly contested human rights issues. To the extent

4

'7

Within domestic systems, these choices typically involve the allocation of power
between branches of government, or between local, state and central governments. In the international context, these choices similarly involve the allocation
of power and authority but focus on its allocation among sovereign governments,
and between those governments and intergovernmental institutions.
A justice's views regarding the appropriate balance between individual rights and
the public interest overlap similar concerns over institutional roles in American
democracy. Thus, for example, it is common to find justices arguing about
whether the Court should adopt a narrow approach to implicit constitutional liberties in order to appropriately limit the judicial role. See, e.g., Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 989 (1994); Glucksberg v. Washington, 521
U.S. 702, 720-21 (1997); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190-96 (1986).

176See,

e.g., Glucksberg v. Washington, supra note 175.
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that international consensus over the appropriate accommodation between majoritarian and individual interests is lacking, on
precisely what basis are international decision-makers to strike
the necessary balance? Should international decision-makers attempt to adopt the particular orientation that the relevant domestic system has previously exhibited toward such issues? Even
assuming that this difficult and amorphous task would be possible, it seems obvious that domestic decision-makers would be far
better situated to evaluate the competing interests involved. In
any case, why should the balance struck by international decision-makers be preferred over that which may be reached
through domestic democratic processes, including judicial
institutions?
Ultimately, it seems probable that international decisionmakers will be forced to strike balances between majoritarian
and individual interests based on ill-defined, arguably non-existent international standards. In the absence of clear international consensus regarding such issues, particularly the
appropriate allocation of authority between judicial and political
institutions, the international judge or expert is essentially left
with only his or her own personal (and cultural) preferences to
work from. Indeed, this seems inevitable even if clear international standards are someday developed. While such accusations
may also be leveled within domestic democratic systems, the international decision-maker is not confined by the host of cultural,
social, political and professional factors that constrain and guide
judges grounded in a particular domestic setting.'77 Perhaps
more fundamentally, the commitment of these issues to international adjudicatory processes may, in essence, supplant domestic
democratic preferences regarding the allocation of institutional
authority. In other words, the commitment of highly contested

'77Although one might argue that there is a universal culture of human rights that
might similarly constrain international decision-makers, the meaning of international rights is currently too underdeveloped and indeterminate to serve this
function. See Donoho, Autonomy, supra note 3, at 391-96, 429-30; supra notes 9193; infra note 181. The persistent debate over the universality of rights and the
role of context and culture in determining their meaning demonstrate that many
human rights norms have no universally accepted specific contextual meaning
that transcends cultural and political boundaries. Donoho, Autonomy, supra.
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human rights issues to international judicial or quasi-judicial authority itself reflects a certain view of the judicial role in democracy that is clearly not universally shared among all societies.
The potential anti-democratic implications of international
judicial resolution of contestable human rights standards are exacerbated by the significant indeterminacy of existing international norms.'78 In significant respects, the domestic debate over
the democratic legitimacy of judicial review is driven by the recognition that the specific meaning of rights is often highly indeterminate.'7 9 Whether conservative or progressive, what critics of
judicial review most fear is that such indeterminacy allows unaccountable judges to substitute personal values and favored outcomes for those that would emerge from deliberative democratic
processes.'
This indeterminacy critique of judicial review is
more powerful internationally than in the context of domestic
constitutional decision-making. The norms with which international human rights decision-makers are entrusted are both significantly indeterminate and highly underdeveloped. In the
context of an enormously diverse world, the specific meaning of
abstractions such as equal protection, free speech, and privacy is
uncertain at best. 8' Many would also argue that the specific
'78

See supra notes 91-93 and accompanying text.

'7

See supra notes 120, 125 and accompanying text. This indeterminacy is especially
acute internationally where profound diversity prevails and consensus over the
meaning and practical application of rights has yet to develop among the world's
diverse societies. See e.g., Donoho, Autonomy, supra note 3, at 391-96, 429-30.
Indeed, many people argue that the specific meaning of some rights must ultimately depend, in some degree, upon the cultural, social and political context in
which they are to be applied. Id. at 399-410, 420-23.

'8

But see West, supra note 121, at 249-51. (suggesting that the meaning of constitutional doctrine in the United States is more or less highly developed, determinate
and conservative in substance).

8 See Donoho, Autonomy, supra note 3, at 391-96, 427-31. The right of privacy, for
example, is recognized in many of the major human rights treaties. Yet, it is
abundantly clear that substantial disagreement exists among (and within) societies and governments regarding the precise meaning and content of the right.
The potential interface between privacy and sexual orientation issues provides
just one of the many potential examples. See Andrew Koppelman, Why Gay Legal History Matters, (book review), 113 HARV. L. REV. 2035, 2057-58 (2000) (noting the indeterminacy of the term "privacy" and divergent applications of the
concept among U.S. states); Anita L. Allen, Coercing Privacy, 40 WM.& MARY L.
REV. 723, 726-27 (1999) (discussing competing visions of privacy within the
American polity); Brenda Thornton, The New InternationalJurisprudenceon the
Right of Privacy: A Head-On Collision With Bowers v. Hardwick, 58 ALB. L.
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meaning of such abstractions is necessarily contextual and ultimately political in nature. 2
The highly indeterminate nature of many international
human rights standards exposes international decision-makers directly to the critique that judges are simply deciding cases based
on their own personal values.8 3 This criticism is especially powerful when international judges or experts attempt to use such
norms to evaluate domestic democratic resolutions of highly contested social and moral issues. Such issues frequently involve
moral judgments and dilemmas over which different societies,
and the people within them, may disagree profoundly. Within
every authentically democratic society, the resolution of such
charged moral issues involves an ongoing process of political and
social contestation bounded by culture, tradition and context.
Whatever their "universality," there are deep and profound- ways
in which some human rights values are indigenous and culturally
bound. 184 Recognition of this does not deny the existence of uni-

versal norms, the potential for change, or the potential for crosscultural learning. It does, however, have significant implications

for the appropriate locus of decision-making, particularly for
highly contested human rights issues over which reasonable people may differ. International decision-making in this regard may
be seen as inevitably divorced from the process of dialogue and
political deliberation that allows societies to work out, in a democratic fashion, the resolution of deep moral issues. The potential
725, 758-74 (1995); J. Cohen, Is There A Duty Of Privacy? Law, Sexual
Orientation, And The Construction Of Identity, 1996 TEx. J. OF WOMEN & L. 88,
88-93. Compare Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) with, Toonen v. Australia, U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., No. 488, U.N. Doc. CCPR/c/50/D/488/1992 (1994)
(Tasmanian sodomy law violates the ICCPR). See also Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 4 EHRR 149 (1981) (sodomy laws violate the European Convention on
Human Rights); accord, Norris v. Ireland, 13 EHRR 186 (1991); Modinos v. Cyprus, 16 EHRR 485 (1993); James Wilets, Conceptualizing Private Violence
Against Sexual MinoritiesAs Gendered Violence: An InternationalAnd Comparative Law Perspective, 60 ALB. L. REV. 989, 1024-30 (1997).
"s See, e.g., B. Kausikan, Asia's Different Standard, 92 FoR. POL'Y 24, 39 (1993). See
also Donoho, Autonomy, supra note 3, at 400-04, 427-31.
'83 See supra notes 120 and 125 and accompanying text.
'
See generally Donoho, Autonomy, supra note 3, at 391-92, 400-06 (reviewing literature). Some have suggested that constitutional authority and meaning is itself
based on the moral consensus of democratic society. See L. Simon, The Authority
Of The Constitution And Its Meaning: A Preface To A Theory Of Constitutional
Interpretation, 58 S.CAL. L. REv. 603, 613-15, 618 (1985).
REV.

Wisconsin InternationalLaw Journal
range of outcomes under international norms are wide in scope
but, unlike domestic decision-makers, international judges and
experts are not constrained by any particular cultural context or
other jurisprudential restraints that help to preserve and respect
democratic choice."' The resolution of such issues may also involve deeply political questions regarding the social order and
the relationship between individuals and governments that may
best be resolved through the unruly process of democratic political deliberation.186 The resulting outcomes, one might argue,
should not lightly be disturbed by international review.
VII.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE DEVELOPMENT OF
THE INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM

The potential tensions between international human rights
decision-making and democratic self-governance raise important
questions regarding the future development of the international
human rights system. What limitations on international human
rights decision-making authority might be necessary and appropriate to preserve local democratic deliberation and choice?
To the extent that international consensus exists over the meaning of rights, one
might reasonably argue that international community values outweigh domestic
preferences, giving the international decision an alternative (non-democratic) basis for legitimacy. International consensus over the specific meaning of rights,
however, is currently limited, probably extending no further than those rights
involving the physical integrity of persons. See supra notes 91-93, 178-184 and
accompanying text. Although international consensus over the meaning of rights
will undoubtedly increase over time, many important human rights issues involve
open-end concepts without fixed meaning and contestable moral and political
judgments that depend on contexts which evolve over time. These judgments are,
in essence, at the heart of democratic deliberation and self-governance.
1, In the domestic context, some favor an authoritative judicial role based upon the
positive influence that courts may have in the development of a moral dialogue
about the protection of individuals and minorities within society. See supra notes
134-36 and accompanying text Similarly, international institutions might well
serve an important moral leadership role. There is, however, an important sense
in which this argument takes a highly backward view of democratic self-governance. Moral leadership from international judges and experts implies a top-down
evolution of critical moral judgments based on the sensibilities of (currently) unaccountable and culturally "disconnected" decision-makers rather than based on
democratic deliberation and choice. This is true even if one uncritically accepts
the idealist perspective that international judges represent the views of the international community. This vision of human rights decision-making narrowly cabins democratic self-rule with a decidedly anti-populist perspective.
185
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How can international decision-makers preserve and protect fundamental international human rights values while at the same
time respect and promote democratic self-governance? Does respect for democracy require continued adherence to the generally ineffectual "promotional" model of human rights?
Most fundamentally, these questions involve deep political
choices regarding the appropriate allocation of decision-making
authority between domestic and international actors. They also
involve basic choices regarding the processes of human rights decision-making and, in particular, the potential role of independent international judges and experts. Ultimately, international
human rights institutions and the international community must
develop a human rights jurisprudence that answers these basic
questions and accounts for the needs of domestic democratic selfgovernance.
There are, on the one hand, many reasons to promote increasingly authoritative international decision-making over some
human rights issues. There are good and rational reasons, for
example, that human rights lawyers often favor judicial resolution of individual human rights problems. The advantage that
prompts this preference is the introduction of independent decision-makers who are not beholden to the alleged perpetrator (by
definition an executive or legislative branch of government).18 7
In the international context, this preference is often magnified by
the paucity of effective domestic remedies for human rights
abuses in those countries where they are most clearly needed.
Human rights advocates quite appropriately seek remedies
Although there is growing recognition of the importance of subjecting certain
non-state actors to international human rights obligations, most human rights
treaties are exclusively directed at governments. Some important exceptions to
this pattern have developed in the field of international humanitarian law, especially under the leadership of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess.,
3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/872 (1993) (Tribunal's Statute); S.C. Res. 808,
U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/808 (1993). See Gabrielle
Kirk McDonald, The InternationalCriminal Tribunals: Crime & Punishment in
the International Arena, 25 NOVA L. REV. 463 (2001). See also Justice Louise
Arbour, Access to Justice: The Social Responsibility of Lawyers: The Prosecution
of International Crimes: Prospects and Pitfalls, 1 WASH. U. J.L. & POL'Y 13
(1999); Barbara Crossette, Crimes Against Humanity: A New Legal Weapon to
Deter Rape, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2001, sec. 4, at 5 (rape held to constitute crime
against humanity by ICTY).
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outside of the legal regime that has perpetrated the abuses they
hope to address. Thus, access to an independent decision-maker
arguably provides a vital reason to favor international resolution
of some human rights disputes and even, perhaps, the development of authoritative international judicial review. After all,
who else may be able to protect the rights of minorities and disfavored individuals from an oppressive government?
On the other side of the ledger, however, international governance over highly contested human rights issues, and in particular authoritative judicial resolution of such issues, poses
important concerns for democratic self-governance. As described above, many of these concerns parallel those that have
prompted the vigorous debate over judicial review in American
society."8 These concerns are, however, more pronounced in the
international context and less likely to be ameliorated by contextual, institutional and culturally based democratic constraints.
There is, in essence, substance to the claim that international experts and judges are unaccountable decision-makers, left to make
important moral decisions over indeterminate legal norms in
ways necessarily disconnected from domestic democratic polities.
International decisions may, if given authoritative status, potentially displace local democratic outcomes through international
processes that are currently deficient in democratic attributes.
Similarly, the adoption of significant international judicial authority has the potential to displace domestic approaches to the
basic political choice as to how best to protect individuals and
minorities under majority rule.189 Regardless of its potential merits, it should be recognized that authoritative international decision-making over human rights issues lies in tension with
domestic democratic expression of such basic political choices.

1s See supra notes 117-36 and accompanying text.
'8

For example, many commentators suggest that judicial review is entirely consistent with American democracy's anti-majoritarian tilt. See supra notes 131-32.
This justification arguably has limited applicability in the international context
where there is no consensus regarding such issues. Many societies clearly do not
demonstrate the strong anti-majoritarian tendencies of American society and are,
on balance, more likely to emphasize communitarian interests rather than those
of individuals. See supra notes 63, 77, 84. The point is that, whether for right or
wrong, democratic self-governance itself suggests that these diverse visions of the
good society be allowed to evolve.
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What conclusions, on balance, can be drawn from this?
First, it seems indisputable that authentic democratic self-governance strongly favors a central role for domestic institutions in the
interpretation and application of international human rights. For
example, international judicial authority is not necessary to bring
the advantages of judicial review to human rights disputes. Domestic judicial institutions could satisfy the functional advantages
of judicial review if not otherwise hindered by oppressive political forces.1" Whatever the merits of domestic judicial review and
the debate over its implications for democracy, its exercise by
domestic judges is far less problematic for democracy than similar international authority. Similarly, in a functional democracy
undistorted by oppressive social and political forces, national legislative and executive branches, checked by the courts, would be
far better situated than international institutions to implement
international human rights standards in ways consistent with domestic democratic processes and sensibilities. In some senses,
the international system's current emphasis on national implementation of rights and direct incorporation may be the most
favorable arrangement for the promotion of democratic self-governance. Democratic legitimacy concerns may also argue in
favor of the promotional model of international supervision with
modest enforcement powers, except over certain rights which enjoy a consensus over meaning among states and a clear substantive content. Although rights fitting this description may
currently only include such heinous wrongs as torture, war
crimes, prolonged arbitrary detention and summary execution,
the list will undoubtedly grow over time.
Second, democratic self-governance also demands that international decision-makers give a significant degree of respect and
deference to the difficult moral judgments that democratic societies make about highly contested human rights issues. If nothing
else, concerns over the democratic legitimacy of future authoritative international human rights decision-making suggest the development of institutional constraints and a jurisprudence that
'9

Judicial independence has been an important theme among many international
human rights institutions in recent years. See supra note 113. It is probably no
accident that repressive governments typically dismantle the judiciary as a first
order of business. The absence of an effective domestic judicial branch provides
an argument in favor of more searching international review.
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takes into account its potential anti-democratic tendencies. Such
concerns may, for example, caution against authoritative international judicial resolution of certain moral issues that are highly
contested within democratic societies. Similarly, international institutions may institute doctrines which favor deference to democratic resolutions of highly contested and difficult moral issues
over which diverse societies may reasonably differ. One likely
mechanism for exercising this deference would be the deployment of standards of reviews that could account for the proper
role of international decision-makers and democratic preferences. Such standards of review, similar to the margin of appreciation doctrine utilized by the ECHR,191 should be designed to
provide a degree of respect for domestic democratic choices that
avoids unnecessary substitution of international preferences for
those produced through authentic democratic expression.
VIII.

CONCLUSION

There is an inherent tension between international governance over human rights and domestic democracy. The lack of
democratic attributes among existing international human rights
institutions may exacerbate this tension and raise concerns over
their democratic legitimacy. Thus, as the authority of the international human rights system evolves, this tension should be
openly acknowledged and accommodated in ways that provide
an appropriate degree of respect for democratic processes, particularly regarding complex, highly contested moral issues.
"' See generally Donoho, Autonomy, supra note 3, at 450-66.

